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ABSTRACT 
Section 75(v) of the Constitution gives the High Court original jurisdiction in all matters in which a 
‘writ of mandamus, prohibition and injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.’ In 
Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth, the High Court held that s 75(v) of the Constitution 
entrenched a minimum provision of judicial review. The preservation of a minimum provision of 
judicial review means that legislative restrictions on the High Court’s s 75(v) jurisdiction are severely 
limited. The Court has made it clear that intrusion upon this minimum provision of judicial review is 
a question of substance and therefore degree. The privative clause, the historically preferred weapon 
of choice to limit judicial oversight, has been rendered largely ineffective by ‘creative’ approaches to 
interpretation. A consequence of the ineffectiveness of privative clauses has been the rise in the use of 
no-invalidity clauses. A no-invalidity clause is a provision in legislation that preserves the validity of 
a decision despite failure to adhere to the requirements in the legislation. By making a claim as to the 
validity of a decision, despite non-compliance with legislative requirements, the no-invalidity clause 
attempts to bring errors made by an administrative decision maker within jurisdiction. Classifying legal 
errors as non-jurisdictional arguably circumvents the exercise of the High Court’s s 75(v) jurisdiction 
to conduct judicial review, which is only available to correct jurisdictional errors of law. This would, 
at least superficially, appear to impede the jurisdiction of the High Court to conduct judicial review 
under its s 75(v) jurisdiction, at least in substance. 
 
In the 2008 High Court decision of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd, the 
High Court gave effect to a broad no-invalidity clause in s 175 of the Income Tax Assessments Act 
1939 (Cth). Section 175 purported to make an income tax assessment valid notwithstanding any failure 
to adhere to the requirements laid out in the legislation. This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with 
the High Court’s broader jurisprudence on s 75(v), notably, the intention of the Court to look to 
substance and not form. However, an exploration of the High Court’s jurisprudence on the entrenched 
minimum provision of judicial review reveals that these concerns may be misguided. This thesis will 
explore key case law surrounding privative and no-invalidity clauses with the hope of rationalising the 
underlying approach that lends meaning to the minimum provision of judicial review. Once this is 
achieved, a more complete picture of the High Court’s decision in Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
v Futuris Corporation Ltd, and the approach to no-invalidity clauses generally, can be better 
understood. 
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   INTRODUCTION 
Section 75(v) of the Constitution gives the High Court of Australia1 original jurisdiction in all matters 
in which a ‘writ of mandamus, prohibition and injunction is sought against an officer of the 
Commonwealth’.2 In Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth (‘Plaintiff S157’),3 the High Court held 
that the preservation of the power to issue the remedies in s 75(v) entrenched a minimum provision of 
judicial review in the Constitution.4 Judicial review is the process by which a superior court can review 
exercises of administrative, judicial or executive power to make sure it was exercised in accordance 
with the law.5 The preservation of a constitutional jurisdiction to conduct judicial review has placed a 
significant obstacle in the path of legislative attempts to insulate administrative decisions from judicial 
review.  
The most common and well-known method of limiting judicial review is through the use of a privative 
clause.6 Privative clauses are clauses that deprive, or purport to deprive, the courts of jurisdiction to 
review the acts of public officials, tribunals or courts.7 These clauses have been rendered largely 
ineffective by a process of statutory construction that will be explored in Chapter II. The ineffectiveness 
of privative clauses has meant that the legislature has had to be more creative, resulting in the use of 
no-invalidity clauses. A no-invalidity clause is a clause that provides that non-compliance with a 
statutory requirement will not result in the invalidity of the decision.8 A no-invalidity clause operates 
to classify legal errors as falling within the jurisdiction of the decision maker.9 Classifying legal errors 
                                               
1 Referred to throughout this thesis as ‘the High Court’ and ‘the Court’ interchangeably. 
2 Australian Constitution s 75(v). 
3 (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
4 Ibid 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
5 Robin Creyke and John McMillan, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2012) 41. 
6 Will Bateman, ‘The Constitution and the substantive principles of judicial review: The full scope of the 
entrenched minimum provision of judicial review’ (2011) 39 Federal Law Review 463, 463. 
7 Nicholas Gouliaditis, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (2010) 34(3) Melbourne University Law Review 870, 870. 
8 Leighton McDonald, ‘The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review and the rule of law’ (2010) 21 
Public Law Review 14, 15; Charles Noonan, ‘Section 75(v), No-invalidity clauses and the Rule of Law’ (2013) 
36(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 437, 458; Giridhar Kowtal, ‘Jurisdictional error and no-
invalidity clauses at State level: Does the High Court still hold all the cards?’ (2015) 22 Australian Journal of 
Administrative Law 253, 253.   
9 Harvey v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] QCA 258, 283-4 [77]-[79] (McMurdo P, with whom 
Philippides JA and Burns J agreed).  
13 
as non-jurisdictional prevents the High Court from reviewing the decision by effectively removing the 
reviewable error.10  
At the Federal level, no-invalidity clauses prevent judicial review by circumventing the High Court’s 
jurisdiction to review exercises of public power under s 75(v). In doing so, no-invalidity clauses have 
the potential to insulate Commonwealth administrative decisions from judicial oversight. Without 
judicial oversight, there is a potential for administrative decision makers to exercise their power with 
boundaries that are no longer enforceable.  
This thesis will centre around the recent High Court decision in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v 
Futuris Corporation Ltd (‘Futuris’).11 In this decision, the High Court gave effect to a broad no-
invalidity clause in the Income Tax Assessments Act 1936 (Cth) (the ‘Tax Act’).12 The no-invalidity 
clause in Futuris, s 175 of the Tax Act, was broad. It purported to validate decisions notwithstanding 
any failure to comply with the requirements laid out in the Tax Act:13 
The validity of any [taxation] assessment shall not be affected by reason that any of the provisions 
of this Act have not been complied with. 
Unsurprisingly, the decision to give effect to s 175 has raised concern amongst commentators that no-
invalidity clauses pose a threat to the rule of law in Australia.14 Some commentators have gone as far 
as to say that the indirect assault on the Court’s ability to conduct judicial review is more effective than 
targeting it directly, for example, with a privative clause.15 
It will be demonstrated, in Chapter III, that the High Court has made a clear commitment to rely upon 
substance, not form, to determine if its s 75(v) jurisdiction is impeded. That is, the Court will look at 
the practical impact of the law and the degree to which it restricts judicial review, rather than just its 
literal form. In substance, no-invalidity clauses appear to intrude upon the minimum provision of 
judicial review by circumventing the operation of s 75(v). Futuris is difficult to reconcile with this 
approach. Section 175 of the Tax Act appears to insulate decisions under the Tax Act from review. As 
                                               
10 The manner in which no-invalidity clauses preclude review is explored in detail in Part B of this chapter, 
specifically Part B.3 which identifies and explains the ‘no-invalidity clause problem’. 
11 (2008) 237 CLR 146. 
12 Ibid 157 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
13 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 175. 
14 See, eg, McDonald, above n 8, 24; Peter Cane and Leighton McDonald, Principles of Administrative Law: 
Legal Regulation of Governance (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008) 209; Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on 
“The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the Rule of Law” by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 
21 Public Law Review 35, 36. 
15 Cane and McDonald, above n 14, 209; Gouliaditis, above n 7, 880; see generally, Mark Aronson, Bruce Dyer 
and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2009) 959-64. 
14 
such, it is difficult to ascertain how the High Court has informed its understanding of the boundaries of 
the minimum provision of judicial review. The Court has done little to provide clarity on the question.16  
This thesis will examine the judicial treatment of privative and no-invalidity clauses, and attempt to 
draw out a principled approach to understand the extent of the minimum provision of judicial review. 
Once an appropriate approach to lend meaning to the minimum provision of judicial review, that is 
consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence, is ascertained, the decision of Futuris and no-invalidity 
clauses more broadly can be placed in perspective. This thesis will argue that the most appropriate 
approach is the rule of law, as the requirement that government is subject to the law, in concert with a 
broader approach to administrative accountability.17 This approach requires reading broadly cast no-
invalidity clauses more restrictively in circumstances where no other adequate means of oversight and 
accountability are in place. A more restrictive reading of no-invalidity clauses reflects an application of 
the narrow approach to construction,18 which is ultimately consistent with the Constitution and 
preserves any threat to the rule of law.  
A  The scope and structure of this thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to assist the reader to develop an understanding of the operation of the 
underlying principle that appears to inform the scope of the minimum provision of judicial review. 
Enabling the reader to develop a more complete understanding of the operation of no-invalidity clauses 
at the Federal level. It will then be possible to better contemplate the High Court’s approach in Futuris. 
A sounder understanding of the Court’s underlying rationale will demonstrate that no-invalidity clauses 
do not pose as large of a threat to the rule of law as first appears. The scope of this thesis is limited to 
the operation of no-invalidity clauses in the context of judicial review of administrative decision 
making. It will not consider their operation in any other context.19 The constraints associated with 
writing a thesis of only 20,000 words necessitate a limitation on the material that can be included. 
Consequently, this thesis will deal with the Federal jurisdiction. However, the jurisprudence on 
                                               
16 Jeremy Kirk, ‘The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review’ (2004) 12 Australian Journal of 
Administrative Law 64, 64; Bateman, above n 6, 463; Cheryl Saunders, 'Plaintiff S157/2002: A Case-Study in 
Common Law Constitutionalism' (2005) 12 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 115, 124.   
17 This approach is explored in detail and measured against other approaches (such as using jurisdictional error as 
the underlying principle) in Chapter IV. 
18 The phrase ‘narrow approach to construction’ refers to applying a narrow interpretation to legislative restrictions 
on judicial review, and has been adopted from the judgment of Edelman J in Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty 
Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 92 ALJR 248 (‘Probuild’) for its clarity and simplicity. It is explored and 
applied to the ‘no-invalidity clause problem’ in Chapter V. 
19 For example, judicial review has a role to play in the review of decisions of inferior courts (indeed, this was the 
original purpose for which judicial review was employed) and the exercise of some powers of the executive. These 
forms of review are not the subject of this thesis. 
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privative and no-invalidity clauses heavily overlaps between the State and Federal levels. The parity in 
approach has meant that the rationale and principles of interpretation are common to both.20  
The conception of the rule of law that is being adopted for the purposes of this thesis is a narrow, formal 
conception. Any reference to the rule of law is concerned only with the idea that government must be 
subject to the law and that it is the role of the judiciary to determine what that law is.21 Additionally, 
this thesis does not claim to make any normative statement about the law; the purpose of this thesis is 
descriptive. The ultimate aim is to explain the interpretation of no-invalidity clauses, not to make any 
value judgment of the law as it stands. Finally, the constitutional injunction will not form part of the 
analysis of this thesis. The injunction in s 75(v) is distinct from the constitutional writs and may not 
require jurisdictional error as a pre-requisite to its availability.22 
This chapter contains the introductory remarks, delimits the scope of the paper and provides essential 
background. Chapter II will explore the judicial treatment of privative and no-invalidity clauses. 
Chapter III asks whether no-invalidity clauses are expressly inconsistent with s 75(v). There is no 
express inconsistency, a no-invalidity clause deals with subject matter distinct from the grant of 
jurisdiction in s 75(v). Chapter III also explores the High Court’s willingness to look to substance over 
form in considering whether the minimum provision of judicial review is impeded. As the question is 
one of substance, it indicates that something more than the literal words in the legislation is informing 
the High Court’s approach. As such, an exploration of the scope of the minimum provision of judicial 
review is necessary.  
Chapter IV will address the need to give scope to the minimum provision of judicial review by exploring 
the merits of jurisdictional error, the rule of law and the broader context of administrative 
accountability. It will be demonstrated that the principle best placed to inform our understanding of the 
minimum provision of judicial review is the rule of law, in concert with a broader approach to 
administrative accountability. Chapter V will examine the application of the narrow approach to 
construction, that will restrict the effectiveness of no-invalidity clauses in circumstances where no 
alternative means of administrative accountability are present.  
                                               
20 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 483 [7] (Gleeson CJ). 
21 This conception of the rule of law should be recognisable as the most commonly understood and accepted aspect 
of the rule of law, an aspect that is often attributed to AV Dicey, see generally, A V Dicey, An Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution (MacMillan, 10th ed, 1959). 
22 For discussion of the inclusion and use of the injunction as a remedy in s 75(v) of the Constitution, including 
whether it requires jurisdictional error for its availability, see generally, Benjamin O’Donnell, ‘Jurisdictional error, 
invalidity and the role of the injunction in s 75(v) of the Constitution’ (2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 291; 
William Gummow, ‘The scope of s 75(v) of the Constitution: Why injunction but no certiorari?’ (2014) 42(2) 
Federal Law Review 241. 
16 
B Background 
The purpose of this part is to provide background to some fundamental concepts. Including, first, a 
discussion of the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review, which will also provide background 
on judicial review and s 75(v) generally. Second, the distinction between and significance of, 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error of law. Last, this part will draw on the preceding discussion 
and explain the no-invalidity clause problem. 
1 The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review 
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, s 75(v) gives the High Court original jurisdiction in all 
matters in which a ‘writ of mandamus, prohibition or injunction is sought against an officer of the 
Commonwealth.’23 The High Court has said that this original jurisdiction entrenches a ‘minimum 
provision of judicial review’.24 A similar result has been achieved at State level.25 The constitutional 
status of judicial review means that it cannot be revoked by ordinary legislation.26 However, the extent 
to which judicial review is entrenched in the Constitution remains unclear.27 A significant component 
of this thesis is devoted to delineating a basis for ascertaining that extent. It is necessary to do so in 
order to determine how no-invalidity clauses interact with s 75(v). 
                                               
23 Australian Constitution s 75(v). What amounts to an ‘officer of the Commonwealth’ is not a closed category, it 
includes members of Federal tribunals: see generally, Re Cram; Ex parte New South Wales Colliery Proprieters 
Association Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 117; and it extends to Federal judges: In Re Gray; Ex parte Marsh (1985) 157 
CLR 351, 385 (Deane J); R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 263 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen 
and Mason JJ). 
24 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); see also 
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165, 1170 
[27] (McHugh and Gummow JJ), 1190 [153] (Kirby J); Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651, 668-669 [45]-[46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ) 
(‘Bodruddaza’); Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 780 [20] (Kiefel CJ, 
Gageler and Keane JJ). 
25 The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review at State level has its foundation in s 73 of the Constitution 
which requires that each State have a body resembling a Supreme Court, a fundamental characteristic of which is 
the jurisdiction to supervise inferior courts and tribunals and to correct jurisdictional errors of law, see generally, 
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531 (‘Kirk’). 
26 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482-3 (Gleeson CJ), 513 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne 
JJ); Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 902 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, 
Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ) (‘Graham’); R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Worker’s Union (1983) 
153 CLR 415, 418 (Mason ACJ and Brennan J) (‘Coldham’); Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth 
(1948) 76 CLR 1, 363 (Dixon J) (‘Bank of New South Wales’). 
27 Kirk, above n 16, 64; Bateman, above n 6, 463; Saunders, above n 16, 124.  
17 
In Plaintiff S157, the Court noted that s 75(v) provided reinforcement for the rule of law in Australia 
by ensuring that executive action was lawful and fell within jurisdiction.28 As such, the importance of 
s 75(v) as a safeguard for the rule of law in Australia cannot be overstated.29 Ensuring the lawfulness 
of executive action is the accountability function of s 75(v). It operates to ensure administrative decision 
makers are held to the jurisdiction conferred upon them. The accountability function of s 75(v) was one 
of several reasons for its inclusion in the Constitution.30 James Stellios, relying upon the Convention 
Debates, has identified three main reasons for the inclusion of s 75(v) in the Constitution. Section 75(v) 
was intended, first, as an allocation of jurisdiction,31 second, to ensure Commonwealth officers were 
proceeded against in a Federal court,32 and third, as an accountability mechanism.33  
Since Federation, the accountability function has come to pass as the primary and most recognisable 
function of s 75(v). In Plaintiff S157, Gleeson CJ emphasized the importance of this accountability 
function.34 The Chief Justice highlighted the remarks of Edmund Barton, made in Melbourne during 
the Convention Debates.35 Barton referred to s 75(v) as giving a citizen the opportunity:36   
[T]o obtain the performance of a clear statutory duty, or to restrain an officer of the Commonwealth 
from going beyond his duty, or to restrain him in the performance of some statutory duty from doing 
some wrong.  
Accordingly, the inclusion of s 75(v) in the Constitution was specifically calculated to ensure the 
accountability of officers of the Commonwealth in the exercise of their public function. For this reason, 
s 75(v) has never been understood to apply only to maintaining observance of constitutional limitations 
on executive and legislative power. Rather, s 75(v) preserves a jurisdiction capable of restraining 
                                               
28 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482-3 [5] (Gleeson CJ), 513-514 [103]-[104] (Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Graham (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 902 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and 
Gordon JJ). 
29 Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372, 438 (Kirby J); Haneef v 
Minister for Immigration and citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 40, 44 (Spender J). 
30 James Stellios, ‘Exploring the purposes of s 75(v) of the Constitution’ (2011) 34 University of New South Wales 
Law Journal 70, 72. 
31 Section 75(v) as an allocation of jurisdiction was motivated by the intention to prevent the High Court 
experiencing the same problem as was experienced in Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 137 where the United 
States Supreme Court found that it had no power to issue the writ of mandamus to a Federal officer because it had 
no jurisdiction (the jurisdiction had not been provided for in the United States Constitution). 
32 Official Record of the Convention Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 
1879 (Josiah Symon): it would be ‘cumbrous and undesirable if an officer of the Commonwealth could be 
proceeded against in a State court’. 
33 Stellios, above n 30, 72. 
34 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482-3 [5] (Gleeson CJ).  
35 Ibid.  
36 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 March 1898, 1884-5 
(Edmund Barton). 
18 
officers of the Commonwealth from exceeding Federal power generally.37 The writs may issue to 
restrain administrative decision makers empowered by Federal acts of parliament.38 In this way, s 75(v) 
entrenches a jurisdiction that operates to preserve the observance of the rule of law by public bodies in 
Australia in general. The jurisdiction to issue the public law remedies is often referred to as supervisory 
jurisdiction. The exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is how superior courts maintain accountability. 
Supervisory jurisdiction refers to the review of an exercise or purported exercise of administrative, 
executive or judicial power and to grant relief in the nature of certiorari,39 prohibition,40 and mandamus41 
where jurisdictional error is found.42 The High Court also has, under its original jurisdiction conferred 
by s 75(v), jurisdiction to issue injunction.43 
Traditionally, superior courts have had jurisdiction to supervise inferior courts, tribunals and the 
executive.44 Indeed, it is a principle taken as axiomatic in Australian law.45 The inclusion of prohibition 
and mandamus in the Constitution has resulted in their classification as the ‘constitutional writs’.46 They 
                                               
37 Bank of New South Wales (1948) 76 CLR 1, 363 (Dixon J). 
38 Bodruddaza (2007) 228 CLR 651, 668-669 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 
JJ). 
39 The writ of certiorari commands an inferior court to certify its record of proceedings and allows the superior 
court to quash those proceedings for error of law. Its origins and development are disputed. For discussion of its 
development and use, see generally, SA de Smith, ‘The prerogative writs’ (1951) 11(1) Cambridge Law Journal 
40, 45-7; Edith Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law: Certiorari and Mandamus in the 
seventeenth century (Harvard University Press, 1963) 84-6. 
40 The writ of prohibition restrains an inferior court from exceeding its powers. For discussion of its development 
and use, see generally, Clare Langford, ‘The prerogative writs and the origins of English Administrative law’ 
(2014) 88 Australian Law Journal 567.  
41 The writ of mandamus issues to compel a public officer or body to perform a legal obligation. For discussion 
of its development and use, see generally, Langford, above n 40. 
42 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506 [76] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Futuris 
(2008) 237 CLR 146, 62 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Graham (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 913 [102] 
(Edelman J); see also, Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, [98] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell 
JJ). 
43 Commonwealth Constitution of Australia s 75(v). This thesis will not explore the constitutional injunction, for 
discussion of the inclusion and use of the injunction as a remedy in s 75(v) of the Constitution, including whether 
it requires jurisdictional error for its availability, see generally, Benjamin O’Donnell, ‘Jurisdictional error, 
invalidity and the role of the injunction in s 75(v) of the Constitution’ (2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 291; 
William Gummow, ‘The scope of s 75(v) of the Constitution: Why injunction but no certiorari?’ (2014) 42(2) 
Federal Law Review 241. 
44 Creyke and McMillan, above n 5, 911. 
45 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248 [33] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Attorney-General (NSW) v 
Quin (1990) 194 CLR 355 [69] (Brennan J); Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 175-6 (Brennan, 
Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189, 196-
7 [17] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
46 Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 92-3 [21] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 118 [86] 
(McHugh J), 135-6 [144] (Kirby J), 141-2 [165] (Hayne J) (‘Aala’). It should be noted that this is likely to be 
more than a semantic difference, the operation of the writs may be different to their predecessors, unfortunately 
the constraints imposed on this thesis prevent an exploration of this difference.  
19 
are only available to correct jurisdictional error.47 Certiorari is also available under s 75(v), but only as 
ancillary relief and is vulnerable to legislative exclusion.48 The High Court exercises, through these 
remedies, a constitutional jurisdiction to conduct judicial review. Judicial review is the review of a 
decision to make sure it was taken within the jurisdiction conferred upon the decision maker.49 In this 
way, judicial review is concerned with the enforcement of the rule of law.50 Although this offers 
protection of individual rights, judicial review is not to be understood by reference to the protection of 
those rights.51 The scope of judicial review must be defined in terms of the power conferred and the 
legality of its exercise.52 As such, judicial review enforces the rule of law on public officers and bodies 
by ensuring that decisions are taken in accordance with the power conferred upon them.  
Section 75(v)’s role in the preservation of the rule of law is informed by its underlying place and purpose 
in the Constitution.53 The High Court has made clear that where the place and purpose of s 75(v) is 
under threat, it will read down or invalidate legislative provisions.54 The purpose of s 75(v) is to provide 
a jurisdiction capable of ensuring Commonwealth administrative decision makers remain within the 
jurisdiction conferred upon them.55 The place of s 75(v) in the constitutional structure also has a role to 
play in maintaining the accountability function of s 75(v). The place of s 75(v) in the Constitution 
requires that judicial power only be exercised by a Chapter III Court.56 In the seminal United States 
Supreme Court decision of Marbury v Madison,57 Marshall CJ observed that it is emphatically ‘the 
                                               
47 See generally, Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476. 
48 Ibid 507 [80] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 90-91 [14] 
(Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Re McBain; Ex Parte Bishops Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 
CLR 372, 393-394 [19] (Gleeson CJ), 403 [55] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ) and 440-441 [176] (Kirby J). 
49 Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25, 70 (Brennan J) (‘Church of Scientology’). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, 36 (Brennan J). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Graham (2017) 91 CLR 890, 902 [42]-[44] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); 
Bodruddaza (2007) 228 CLR 651, 668 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); 
Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482-3 [5] (Gleeson CJ), 513-4 [104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby 
and Hayne JJ); See generally, Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 316 [53]-[57] (French 
CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (‘Plaintiff M61’). 
54 Bodruddaza (2007) 228 CLR 651, 671 [53] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); 
Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 482-3 [5] (Gleeson CJ), 513-4 [104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby 
and Hayne JJ). 
55 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 265 [72] (Gageler J); Bank of New South Wales (1948) 76 CLR 1, 363 (Dixon 
J).  
56 Bodruddaza (2007) 228 CLR 651, 668-9 [44]-[46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan 
JJ). 
57 (1803) 5 US 137. 
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province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’58 This has been met with resounding 
support in Australian jurisprudence.59 The separation of judicial power plays a central role in preserving 
individuals from arbitrary government action.60 The emphasis on the judiciary as the arbiter of the 
content of the law is a crucial component of administrative accountability. Parliament cannot confer on 
a non-judicial body the power to conclusively determine the limits of its own jurisdiction.61 If legislative 
restrictions on judicial review were given an operation that reflected their literal meaning the practical 
effect would be to enable a tribunal or officer to determine the limits of their power for themselves.62 
The High Court has said that if a clause has the practical effect of enabling an administrative decision 
maker to determine the limits of its own jurisdiction it will intrude upon the place and purpose of s 
75(v).63 
The jurisdiction to issue the writs under s 75(v) is enlivened in circumstances where a decision is 
affected by jurisdictional error.64 A decision maker will fall into jurisdictional error where they make a 
decision that they had no authority to make.65 Jurisdictional error marks the boundary between validity 
and invalidity;66 it marks the boundary of a decision maker’s lawful authority. The centrality of 
jurisdictional error to the inquiry and its constitutional status is a defining feature of Australian 
Administrative law.67  
                                               
58 Ibid 173 (Marshall CJ); Communist Party of Australia v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262-3 (Fullagar 
J): Marshall CJ’s statement has been accepted as a principle that is “axiomatic” in Australian law. 
59 State of New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118, 137-8 [50] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Bell, Kiefel 
and Keane JJ). 
60 Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521 (Deane J); Duncan Kerr and George Williams, 
‘Review of executive action and the rule of law under the Australian Constitution’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 
219, 227. 
61 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513 [104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Kerr and 
Williams, above n 60, 227. 
62 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 505-6 [75] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
63 Bodruddaza (2007) 228 CLR 651, 671 [53] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
64 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 506 [76] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Futuris 
(2008) 237 CLR 146, 162 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Graham v Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 913 [102] (Edelman J); see also Robert French, ‘Constitutional Review 
of Executive Decisions: Australia’s US legacy’ (2010) 35 University of Western Australia Law Review 35, 45.  
65 Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163, 179 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh 
JJ) (‘Craig’).  
66 Gouliaditis, above n 7, 880. 
67 Daniel Reynolds, ‘The Constitutionalision of Administrative Law: Navigating the cul-de-sac’ (2013) 74 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 73, 75; Steven Gageler, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the 
Development of Australian Administrative Law’ (2010) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92, 100; 
James Spigelman, ‘The centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Federal Law Review 77, 84.  
 
21 
2 Jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error of law 
Jurisdiction refers to the ‘authority to decide’.68 Jurisdictional error arises where a decision maker makes 
a decision outside of the authority conferred upon them by statute.69 It defines the limits of the authority 
of officers exercising public power.70 Despite what would appear to be a reasonably clear definition, 
jurisdictional error can be an elusive concept.71 It is the conclusion to the inquiry of whether a ground 
of judicial review has been successfully proved, rather than the starting point of the inquiry.72 Mark 
Aronson, in acknowledging this particular characteristic, described jurisdictional error as being a means 
of pronouncing on the legality of a decision rather than any test for legality.73  
In Craig v The State of South Australia,74 the High Court described jurisdictional error as arising if a 
ground of review is made out; thus if:75 
[An administrative tribunal] falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to 
ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in 
some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the 
tribunal’s exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or 
powers. Such an error of law is a jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of 
the tribunal which reflects it. 
Where a decision maker falls into an error of this kind, the decision will be affected by jurisdictional 
error.76 Decisions affected by jurisdictional error are unauthorized by law, they are taken outside the 
                                               
68 Mark Leeming, ‘The riddle of jurisdictional error’ (2014) 38 Australian Bar Review 139, 140. 
69 Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 141 (Hayne J). 
70 Mark Leeming, Authority to Decide: The law of jurisdiction in Australia (The Federation Press, 1st ed, 2012, 
Sydney) 46. 
71 Bros Bins Systems Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2008) 74 NSWLR 257 [36] 
(Spigelman CJ) citing City of Yonkers v United States (1944) 320 US 685, 695 in which Frankfurter J referred to 
the use of the word ‘jurisdiction’ as one of the most deceptive legal pitfalls.  
72 Matthew Alderton, ‘When jurisdictional errors are not remedied: refusal of constitutional relief on discretionary 
grounds’ (2015) 23(1) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 15, 20; Leeming, above n 70, 48; SDAV v 
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural affairs (2003) 199 ALR 43; [2003] FCAFC129, [27] (Hill, Branson and 
Stone JJ). 
73 Mark Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error without the Tears’ in Matthew Groves and H P Lee (eds), Australian 
Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (2007) 333; see also James Spigelman, ‘Public Law 
and the Executive’ (2010) 34 Australian Bar Review 10, 16; Aronson, Dyer and Groves, above n 15, 14. 
74 (1995) 184 CLR 163. 
75 Craig (1995) 184 CLR 163, 179 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); see also Aronson, Dyer 
and Groves, above n 15, 17-18. 
76 Ibid. It should be noted that the grounds listed are examples and not a definitive list of the errors that will give 
rise to jurisdictional error.  
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decision maker’s power. For this reason, they are not considered to be decisions at all.77 The list of 
grounds giving rise to jurisdictional error is not closed.78 
By delineating the boundary between validity and invalidity, jurisdictional error is the status that defines 
the limits of power. Former Chief Justice of the High Court, Robert French, said:79 
Ultimately, the question of jurisdictional error is, for all intents and purposes, one of power. The 
question is, did the decision maker have the power to make the decision or, relevantly to mandamus, 
did the decision maker wrongfully decline to fulfil his or her duty to make the decision? 
The concept of jurisdictional error should be understood in relation to non-jurisdictional error of law. 
Not all errors of law are jurisdictional.80 In Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala,81 Hayne J remarked 
that a non-jurisdictional error of law occurs where a decision maker incorrectly decides a question 
which they were authorised to decide.82 Decision makers who have authority to decide a question 
correctly, must also have jurisdiction to decide the question incorrectly. Jurisdiction refers to the 
authority to decide the question, as long as the answer reflects the question that the decision maker was 
empowered to resolve the decision maker will not fall into jurisdictional error. A non-jurisdictional 
error of law occurs where a decision maker incorrectly answers a question that they were empowered 
to answer. It is worth noting that this distinction is unique to Australian law, other common law 
jurisdictions have all but eliminated the concept.83  
Consequently, because of the role of jurisdictional error as the prerequisite to the grant of the 
constitutional writs, it is ensconced in the jurisprudence of the High Court. The use of the phrase itself, 
‘jurisdiction error’, is an accident of history and has brought with it the difficulties associated with the 
concept of jurisdiction.84 Jurisdictional error involves a question of statutory construction and is 
                                               
77 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597, 614-15 (Gaudron and 
Gummow JJ). 
78 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 [80] (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ with Gleeson CJ and Gaudron J agreeing) (‘Yusuf’); Aronson, Dyer and Groves, above n 15, 8. 
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81 Ibid. 
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therefore entirely dependent on statutory context.85 This is the basis for the no-invalidity clause 
problem.  
3 The no-invalidity clause problem 
A no-invalidity clause is a legislative provision that operates to circumvent judicial review by stating 
that an exercise of statutory power is valid notwithstanding a breach of a particular statutory 
requirement.86 The limits of jurisdiction are determined by reference to the intention of parliament 
through an interpretation of a formally enacted statute.87 A no-invalidity clause is designed to expand 
the jurisdiction of a decision maker by bringing errors that would otherwise be jurisdictional, within 
jurisdiction.88 There are different types of no-invalidity clause, broad and narrow (conceivably, also 
anywhere in between). Broad no-invalidity clauses target the validity of decisions taken under an act or 
a part of an act.89 On the other hand, narrow no-invalidity clauses target specific legislative 
requirements.90  
Section 175 of the Tax Act is an example of a broad no-invalidity clause and was given in the 
introductory remarks of this thesis. The declaration in s 175 that an assessment will be valid 
notwithstanding any breach, includes all requirements under the Tax Act. In comparison, multiple 
examples of narrow no-invalidity clauses can be found in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the ‘Migration 
Act’).91 For example, s 501G(4) states that the failure to comply with the duty to provide reasons for 
the decision to cancel a visa does ‘not affect the validity of the decision’ to cancel the visa.92 
                                               
85 Leeming, above n 70, 48. 
86 Lisa Burton Crawford, ‘Who decides the validity of executive action? No-invalidity clauses and the separation 
of powers’ (2017) 24 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 81, 81-2. 
87 Jeffery Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
232.  
88 McDonald, above n 8, 18. 
89 Burton Crawford, above n 86, 83. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Mark Aronson has observed that there are at least ‘three dozen’ no-invalidity type provisions in the Migration 
Act, for discussion, see generally, Mark Aronson, ‘The Growth of Substantive Review: the Changes, their Causes 
and their Consequences’, in John Bell et al, (eds), Public Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process 
and Substance (Hart Publishing, 2016) Ch 6.  
92 Migration Act 2001 (Cth) s 501G(4). Other examples of no-invalidity clauses include: Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth)  s 53 ‘The validity of an assessment is not affected because any provision of this Act 
has not been complied with’; Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 205 ‘The validity of an assessment is not 
affected by a contravention of this Act’; Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 (Cth) s 65 ‘The 
validity of an assessment is not affected by a failure to comply with this Act’. 
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There can be good policy reasons for enacting a no-invalidity clause. Legislative restrictions on judicial 
review are important for establishing certainty and finality.93 The construction industry provides a 
particularly cogent example of an area where finality and certainty are valuable. Construction 
companies are heavily dependent on substantial projects and extensive ongoing litigation can create 
difficulties for both the projects and the existence of the companies themselves.94 Where finality and 
certainty are crucial, restrictions on judicial review are important. As well as this, there is often a need 
to channel decision making and review into a tribunal of specialist knowledge.95 For example, in 
industrial relations an intimate understanding of the subject matter provides a basis for more efficient 
and effective decision making.96 No-invalidity clauses, as well as other restrictions on judicial review, 
facilitate this.  
Most importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, no-invalidity clauses are tied directly to the 
question of validity. Invalidity is the direct consequence of a finding of jurisdictional error.97 No-
invalidity clauses target jurisdiction by attempting to classify non-compliance with statutory 
requirement(s) as non-jurisdictional. Without a jurisdictional error the constitutional writs are not 
available to remedy the non-compliance. This is the no-invalidity clause problem. They operate to 
circumvent the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review by leaving the Court with ‘nothing on 
which to bite’.98 In Futuris, the High Court gave effect to s 175 of the Tax Act.99 It was determined, by 
the majority, that where s 175 applied, errors in the process of assessment100 did not go to jurisdiction 
and therefore could not attract a remedy for jurisdictional error.101 On its face, the Court’s approach 
appears to be inconsistent with its existing jurisprudence on the entrenched minimum provision of 
judicial review. The subject matter of this case will be explored in more detail in chapter II.  
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taxpayer’s tax liability. 
101 Futuris (2008) 37 CLR 146, 157 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
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   THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO PRIVATIVE AND NO-INVALIDITY CLAUSES 
A Introduction 
For as long as the courts have exercised their supervisory jurisdiction the legislature has tried to curb 
or remove it. Statutory restrictions on judicial review have taken a number of forms.102 The most 
common and well-known approach is through the use of a privative clause.103 The case law on privative 
clauses has dealt with the purview of s 75(v) and can offer insight into the entrenched minimum 
provision of judicial review. This chapter will first examine the judicial response to privative clauses. 
An understanding of the treatment of privative clauses is important for developing an understanding of 
the High Court’s approach to no-invalidity clauses. The Court has made important remarks in privative 
clause cases about how the s 75(v) jurisdiction operates.  
No-invalidity clauses have been considered in a number of High Court decisions. This thesis will 
consider some key cases that illustrate the High Court’s approach. In both Futuris and Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (‘Palme’),104 the Court gave 
effect to each no-invalidity clause, allowing them to operate effectively to oust judicial review. This 
came as a shift from the 1995 case of Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter (‘Richard 
Walter’),105 where the Court’s treatment of the no-invalidity clause had been similar to its treatment of 
privative clauses. This chapter will outline the judicial approach to privative clauses by discussing some 
major cases. It will then explore the High Court’s consideration of no-invalidity clauses.  
B Privative Clauses 
Privative clauses are clauses that deprive, or purport to deprive, the courts of jurisdiction to review the 
acts of public officials, tribunals or courts.106 A privative clause can purport to exclude judicial review 
completely, or in part and can take a number of forms.  For example, a clause that stipulates that an 
administrative decision is final, a clause that bars the issue of particular administrative law remedies, a 
                                               
102 For a list and discussion of the common ways in which parliament can restrict access to judicial review, see 
generally, Aronson, Dyer and Groves, above n 15, 943-4; The Administrative Review Council’s Discussion Paper, 
The Scope of Judicial Review, 2003, 16. 
103 Bateman, above n 6, 463. 
104 (2003) 216 CLR 212. 
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clause that limits the grounds upon which judicial review is available, or provides time limits within 
which aggrieved persons must seek judicial review.107  
An extensive, or complete, privative clause will exclude the decisions taken under the act from review 
and outline remedies that the court is unable to issue. The paramount example of the complete privative 
clause is s 474 of the Migration Act:108 
(1) A privative clause decision:109 
(a)   is final and conclusive; and 
(b)   must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed, or called into question 
in any court; and 
(c)   not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any 
court on any account.  
Provisions of this kind are common, particularly in areas of law that are more politically charged. For 
example, industrial relations legislation110 and in the Migration Act.111 They reflect government 
attempts to control the outcome of administrative decisions related to politically sensitive subject 
matter. As a result, litigation in these areas has massively influenced the development of Administrative 
law in Australia. 
Understandably, however, the courts are resistant to the prospect of administrative decisions being 
excluded from review.112 A central aspect of the rule of law, as observed by A V Dicey, is that every 
person is equally subject to the law, even government.113 The rule of law is an assumption upon which 
the Constitution is premised.114 If privative clauses were given their literal meaning they would 
                                               
107 The Administrative Review Council’s Discussion Paper, The Scope of Judicial Review, 2003, 157-164; Creyke 
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108 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474(1). 
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110 See, eg, Reg 17 of the National Security (Coal Mining Industry Employment) Regulations 1941 (Cth) and s 
179 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW). 
111 For a discussion of the impact of Migration law on the development of Administrative law in Australia see 
generally, Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of Australian Administrative Law’ 
(2010) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92. 
112 Svecova v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (1991) 39 IR 328, 330 (Kirby P); William, Wade, 
Constitutional Fundamentals (Stephen & Sons, 1988) 66. 
113 A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (MacMillan, 10th ed, 1959) 193; Augusto 
Zimmerman, Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives (LexisNexis Butterworths, NSW, 1st ed, 
2013) 84. 
114 Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 (Dixon J); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 
CLR 476, 492 [31] (Gleeson CJ), 513 [103] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).  
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contravene s 75(v).115 The grant of limited jurisdiction coupled with the removal of any supervision and 
maintenance of that jurisdiction, gives rise to a prima facie inconsistency.116 This inconsistency began 
receiving recognition when it was observed by Griffith CJ in the early 20th century.117 This rationale, 
coupled with the presumption of legality, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V, has 
substantially informed the judiciary’s approach to privative clauses.118 The balancing act of giving 
effect to the intention of parliament and preserving these fundamental principles is a difficult task. The 
Court also presumes that parliament intended to enact legislation consistent with the Constitution.119 
The outcome is that privative clauses have been read narrowly, as preserving decisions from review 
only where the decision is not subject to jurisdictional error.120  
Even before Federation, for more than a century, the legislature made use of clauses that purported to 
oust the jurisdiction of courts to hear applications for the prerogative writs.121 Prior to federation, 
privative clauses were somewhat effective at controlling the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. Courts 
always retained their supervisory jurisdiction but its manner of exercise was controlled and limited by 
the privative clause.122 The boundaries, beyond which privative clauses were deemed to be ineffective, 
were circumstances of significant error. These were described as decisions affected by ‘manifest defect 
of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made it, or of manifest fraud in the party procuring it.’123 As an 
example of manifest defect of jurisdiction, a tribunal established to determine whether mining 
companies are financially viable, and if not to appoint receivers, has no jurisdiction to appoint receivers 
to a company involved in the production of automobiles for consumers.124 If such a tribunal did so, it 
                                               
115 Graham (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 902 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
116 R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox (1945) 70 CLR 598, 616 (Dixon J) (‘Hickman’); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 
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117 Clancy v Butchers’ Shop Employees Union (1904) 1 CLR 181, 197 (Griffith CJ) (‘Clancy’); see also Baxter v 
New South Wales Clicker’s Association (1909) 10 CLR 114, 128 (Griffith CJ), 139-40 (Barton J). 
118 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 270 [87] (Edelman J) citing Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian 
Worker’s Union (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [21] (Gleeson CJ); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492-3 [32]-
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121 see, eg R v Jukes (1800) 8 TR 542; R v Moreley (1760) 2 Burr. 1040; R v Plowright (1685) 3 Mod. 94. 
122 The Colonial Bank of Australasia v Robert Willan (Victoria) [1874] UKPC 28, 32 (Colvile, Peacock, Smith 
and Collier LJJ) (‘Willan’). 
123 Ibid. 
124 This example is taken partially from the case in Willan, where the Judge of the Court of Mines made a decision 
to impose a winding up order on a company that was outside the Court of Mines’ jurisdiction.  
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would fall into jurisdictional error and a privative clause, on its proper construction, would not preserve 
the decision from review.  
Privative clauses have, in this way, always been narrowly construed and given a meaning slightly 
different from what the literal words convey. This has been the case even without constitutional 
considerations pre-Federation.125 After Federation, the general position that privative clauses were 
ineffective to oust the court’s power to issue the (now ‘constitutional’) writs continued, finding support 
in s 75(v).126 Federal and State privative clauses continued to be ineffective in ousting judicial review 
for significant error of jurisdiction.127 In Clancy v Butchers’ Shop Employees Union,128 Griffith CJ noted 
that the rationale for restricting the effect of privative clauses was to resolve an inconsistency within 
the legislation.129 If not, to remove supervision of inferior courts and administrative tribunals would be 
to effectively give them an unlimited jurisdiction.130 Similar observations were made in R v 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow.131 Privative clauses were 
understood on the basis that they could only preclude review for minor/non-jurisdictional errors of 
law.132 
1  R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox 
Justice Dixon, in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox (‘Hickman’),133 sought to clarify how privative clauses 
were to be approached. If Parliament grants a decision maker limited jurisdiction, only to then declare 
that decisions of that decision maker are unreviewable, the limited grant of jurisdiction is unenforceable. 
Justice Dixon set about to clarify this contradiction. The High Court was required to decide whether the 
writ of prohibition was available notwithstanding a privative clause. The privative clause was Reg 17 
of the National Security (Coal Mining Industry Employment) Regulations. Regulation 17 stated that a 
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decision of a local reference board (the ‘Reference Board’) ‘shall not be challenged, appealed against, 
quashed, or called into question, or be subject to mandamus, prohibition or certiorari.’134  
The Reference Board had made a determination that particular haulage contractors were employees of 
the coal mining industry and therefore were entitled to be remunerated under the Mechanics (Coal 
Mining Industry) Award.135 The jurisdiction of the Reference Board only extended to settling disputes 
between employers and employees of the coal mining industry. The contractors’ employers sought a 
writ of prohibition to prevent the decision from being proceeded upon. Despite the existence of Reg 17, 
the High Court issued the writ. It did so on the ground that the privative clause could only extend to 
decisions affecting ‘employees of the coal mining industry,’ which the contractors were not.136 The 
Reference Board had no jurisdiction to make the determination and had fallen into jurisdictional error.  
Justice Dixon considered, and rejected, an argument that Reg 17 precluded relief entirely. His Honour 
explained that privative clauses were never intended to actually remove the supervisory jurisdiction of 
the High Court. Rather, they were intended to mean that no decision taken by the decision making body 
was to be invalidated on the basis that certain requirements, laid out in the legislation empowering the 
decision maker, had not been adhered to.137 The privative clause was never intended to displace the 
High Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v). Indeed, it could never do so. On this point, Dixon J said the 
following:138 
[Privative clauses] are not to be interpreted as meaning to set at large the courts or other judicial 
bodies to whose decision they relate. Such a clause is interpreted as meaning that no decision which 
is in fact given by the body concerned shall be invalidated on the ground that it has not conformed 
to the requirements governing its proceedings or the exercise of its authority or has not confined its 
acts within the limits laid down by the instrument giving it authority… 
Following on from this observation, Dixon J established a set of criteria that, if satisfied, insulated the 
decision from review without contravening s 75(v). The requirements outlined by Dixon J consisted of, 
first, that the decision taken was bona fide, second, that the decision relates to the subject matter of the 
legislation and, third, that the decision is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the 
body.139  
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Justice Dixon’s approach hinged on the need to reconcile the provisions in light of an interpretation of 
the whole legislative instrument.140 In this way, parliamentary intention could be supported and an 
interpretation consistent with s 75(v) was recognisable. The satisfaction of these requirements 
reconciled the prima facie inconsistency first observed by Griffith CJ in Clancy.141 The approach was 
taken up subsequently by the High Court and State Supreme Courts.142 Justice Dixon’s ‘Hickman 
Provisos’ became entrenched as the authoritative principle underlying the interpretation of privative 
clauses.143 However, despite being widely adopted, the Hickman Provisos have been subject to criticism 
associated with their significant complexity, artificiality and difficulty in application.144 
2 Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth 
Plaintiff S157 is the High Court’s seminal case on the interpretation of privative clauses. The High 
Court engaged in a thorough discussion of the principles applicable to the interpretation of privative 
clauses, taking advantage of an opportunity to put the Hickman Provisos into ‘perspective’.145 The 
Plaintiff applied for writs of prohibition and mandamus, and certiorari as ancillary relief, with respect 
to a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) to refuse the granting of a Protection 
Visa.146 The High Court had to consider the effect of s 474 of the Migration Act which purported, if 
given a literal interpretation, to exclude the High Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v).147 Section 474 was 
provided above as an example of the ‘complete’ privative clause.148  
The application was made on the ground of denial of procedural fairness. The allegation was that the 
Tribunal took information into account that, although relevant, the Plaintiff had no opportunity to 
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respond to. Section 474 of the Migration Act presented an obstacle to judicial review under s 75(v) and 
the Court was forced to consider whether it precluded relief. Ultimately, the Court found s 474 was 
inadequate to prevent review for denial of procedural fairness.149 In the context of the legislation as a 
whole, procedural fairness was considered to be a crucial component of the Tribunal’s decision. Failure 
to provide the Plaintiff with an opportunity to respond to the information constituted a jurisdictional 
error. This was the case despite the fact that there had been no suggestion that the Tribunal had not 
acted bona fide in its assessment, and that both other Hickman Provisos were satisfied.150  
The High Court concluded that s 75(v) entrenched a minimum provision of judicial review, as discussed 
above.151 The privative clause was not declared to be invalid, however, it could only operate in respect 
of non-jurisdictional errors of law.152 It remained beyond the power of the legislature to prevent judicial 
review of jurisdictional error. In this way, jurisdictional error was centralised as the main focus of the 
inquiry. The joint-judgment made the following observation:153 
[A] privative clause cannot protect against a failure to make a decision required by the legislation 
in which that clause is found or against a decision which… exceeds jurisdiction. 
The process of statutory interpretation that applies is an inquiry about jurisdiction and, therefore, 
statutory interpretation. There were ‘inviolable limitations’ which could never attract the protection of 
the privative clause.154 This moved the emphasis away from the reconciliation process advanced by 
Dixon J. 
However, the Hickman Provisos still have a significant role to play, as Gleeson CJ observed, they are 
heavily entrenched in the jurisprudence of the Court.155 His Honour observed that the Hickman provisos 
can only form part of the assessment.156 A decision taken under the Migration Act to grant or refuse a 
visa would always relate to the subject matter of the legislation and be reasonably capable of reference 
to the power. Chief Justice Gleeson astutely pointed out, however, that it could not be said that the 
intention of the parliament was such that decisions that were unfair, but taken bona fide, were to be 
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preserved from review because such human rights were at stake.157 If it was the intention of the 
legislature, it was not made sufficiently clear.158 
Importantly, whether the breach attracted the protection of the privative clause by meeting the Hickman 
Provisos was only part of a larger question of statutory construction.159 The assessment of whether a 
jurisdictional error arose in the circumstances depended upon an interpretative exercise involving all 
relevant principles of statutory construction.160 The privative clause does not operate to expand the 
jurisdiction of the decision maker, it is only part of the broader process of statutory construction.161 
What can be seen from this reasoning is that the privative clause is, essentially, gutted.162 The clause is 
left with virtually nothing to do. It protects against the review of non-jurisdictional errors of law, but 
whether errors of law are jurisdictional or not depends on the application of all relevant principles of 
construction. Accordingly, the Hickman Provisos form only part of the broader process of statutory 
construction. No-invalidity clauses pose a slightly different question, but require similar considerations.  
C No-invalidity Clauses 
No-invalidity clauses pose a unique problem. The consequence of a decision maker falling into 
jurisdictional error is that the decision is invalid, but a no-invalidity clause purports to prevent that 
outcome. This raises questions about how they should be approached in light of s 75(v). In the Tax Act 
case of Richard Walter, a majority of the High Court identified an apparent prima facie inconsistency, 
of the kind identified in Hickman, between the no-invalidity clause in s 175 and the broader Tax Act. 
The Hickman approach was applied to resolve that inconsistency. However, subsequent cases have 
taken an alternative approach. In both Palme, a Migration Act case, and Futuris, another Tax Act case, 
the High Court did not consider that any prima facie inconsistency arose between a no-invalidity clause 
and the other provisions in the Tax Act. Therefore, no reconciliation process was required to make the 
provisions compatible.  In both Palme and Futuris the majority concluded that the question to be asked 
was actually the question posed in Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Association (‘Project 
Blue Sky’).163 
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The Project Blue Sky test for whether a decision, taken in breach of particular legislative requirements, 
is invalid, is to be resolved based upon the construction of the legislation as a whole. The essential 
question is to ask whether it was a ‘purpose’ of the legislation that an act done or not done, in breach 
of a legislative requirement, should render the decision invalid.164 In determining the question of 
purpose, regard must be had to the language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the 
statute as a whole.165 The Project Blue Sky test for validity is preferred where no process of 
reconciliation is necessary. Consideration of the above key authorities on no-invalidity clauses will 
begin with the case of Richard Walter. 
1  Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter 
In the case of Richard Walter, the High Court dealt with the broad no-invalidity clause under s 175 of 
the Tax Act. At the time this case was heard, there had been a number of earlier cases dealing with s 
175, its place in the Tax Act, and its effectiveness at precluding judicial review.166 Richard Walter 
consolidated the pre-existing jurisprudence, and the approach adopted was to consider s 175 as a 
privative type provision. Richard Walter Pty Ltd sought judicial review of the Deputy Commissioner’s 
assessment of their tax liability for the years ending 30 June 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. This 
assessment included a much higher tax liability than Richard Walter Pty Ltd had anticipated because it 
included the tax liability of a related entity. The Commissioner had applied anti-avoidance provisions 
under Part IVA of the Tax Act.167 The Part IVA provisions apply as part of the assessment of the 
taxpayer’s overall tax liability.168  
Richard Walter Pty Ltd alleged that double counting had occurred and that the Commissioner had not 
acted bona fide in the making of the assessment. Judicial review of the decision was sought in the 
Federal Court and the effect of s 175 of the Tax Act had to be considered. The case was removed into 
the High Court to consider the question. The Court found that s 175 did not preclude wholly, or in part, 
judicial review of an assessment taken under the Tax Act.169 The application for review did, however, 
fail in the circumstances of the case because the assessment had been made bona fide.  
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An explanation of ss 175 and 177(1) of the Tax Act is useful here, because it also applies to the decision 
in Futuris. Section 175 is the no-invalidity clause, it was given as an example above but has been 
reproduced here to assist the reader:170 
The validity of any assessment shall not be affected by reason that any of the provisions of this act 
have not been complied with. 
Section 177(1) provided for the production of a ‘Notice of Assessment’. Under s 177(1) that notice was 
to be considered conclusive evidence of the due making of an assessment and that the particulars of the 
assessment were correct.171 However, s 177(1) did not apply to proceedings taken under Part IVC of 
the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (‘the Tax Admin Act’).172 Part IVC of the Tax Admin Act 
involved appeals processes that could be instigated under s 175A of the Tax Act.  
Discussion of the effect of ss 175 and 177(1) of the Tax Act, and their potential interaction with s 75(v) 
of the Constitution was necessary in Richard Walter, because of the protection from review that ss 175 
and 177(1) purported to afford. Chief Justice Mason treated the operation of ss 175 and 177(1) 
collectively as privative type clauses. His Honour relied upon Dixon J’s discussion in Hickman. Where 
limitations are conferred upon a decision maker, and there is a clause preventing the enforcement of 
those limitations, it becomes a question of interpreting the legislation as a whole to ascertain whether 
transgression of the limitations results in invalidity.173 In R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Worker’s 
Union,174 Mason CJ and Brennan J had stated that this approach was necessary where there was a need 
to reconcile an internal inconsistency.175 In Richard Walter, Chief Justice Mason concluded that ss 175 
and 177(1) presented such an inconsistency, and operated in the same manner as a privative clause.176 
However, his Honour went on to observe that the operation of s 177(1) was on the substantive law as 
an evidentiary provision.177 Specifically, s 177(1) gave effect to s 175 which operated to preserve the 
validity of decisions of the Commissioner outside of the review proceedings under the Tax Admin 
Act.178 Construed in this manner, ss 177(1) and 175 operated such that there was no inconsistency with 
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s 75(v).179 The combined operation of the sections could preclude review if decisions were taken 
consistently with the Hickman Provisos.180 
Justice Brennan specifically addressed s 175, and similarly concluded that it operated like a privative 
clause. His Honour stated:181 
When the general provisions of a statute prima facie condition the valid exercise of a power and are 
found together with another provision which confers validity on a purported exercise of the power 
despite a failure to comply with the general provisions, the problem of reconciling the general 
provisions and the validating provision is indistinguishable from that which arises when a privative 
clause withdraws jurisdiction to review. 
This approach was also applied to s 175 by Deane and Gaudron JJ.182 However, both Dawson and 
Toohey JJ could see no internal inconsistency arising between s 175 and the requirements imposed 
under the Tax Act.183 Their Honours concurred on the point that s 175 had no operation where no valid 
assessment had been made and that s 177(1) purported to exclude evidence of any claim, other than for 
review the Tax Admin Act.184 Accordingly, their Honours saw no place for the application of the 
Hickman Provisos, a view which the High Court adopted as the correct one in Palme.  
2 Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme 
This case dealt with a narrow no-invalidity clause. Under the character cancellation provisions in the 
Migration Act there is a requirement to give reasons.185 Section 501G, the section requiring the Minister 
to give reasons, also contains a provision that purports to prevent the invalidity of a decision to cancel 
a visa on character grounds when the decision maker fails to provide reasons as required by s 501G.186 
The Plaintiff in this case was a German national who had lived in Australia since 1971 and was subject 
to a visa cancellation under s 501 of the Migration Act. The Plaintiff had been convicted of murder in 
1992 and was serving a lengthy sentence. The term of imprisonment had not expired when the visa was 
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cancelled. He had never taken up Australian citizenship and had resided in Australia on a transitional 
visa.187 
The Minister cancelled the visa on the basis of a departmental recommendation that contained four 
options, exercising his power under the section by crossing out three of those four options. The 
recommendations were then provided to the Plaintiff in purported satisfaction of the requirement under 
s 501 to give reasons. The Plaintiff challenged the Minister’s decision on the basis of having been 
denied procedural fairness, because he had not been given the departmental recommendation and had 
no opportunity to comment upon it. In addition, he argued that the recommendations did not amount to 
reasons of the Minister and consequently the obligation to give reasons had not been met and the 
decision was invalid.  
Palme is of particular interest as it came shortly after the High Court’s privative clause decision in 
Plaintiff S157 where the Hickman Provisos were ‘placed in perspective’.188 Relevantly, Palme dealt 
with s 501G(4) of the Migration Act, which is a no-invalidity clause. Section 501G(4) purported to 
validate decisions taken under s 501, notwithstanding a failure by the Minister to provide reasons in 
accordance with the requirement to do so. Chief Justice Gleeson, and Gummow and Heydon JJ formed 
the majority. Their Honours approached the question of validity by applying the test articulated by the 
majority in Project Blue Sky.189 As discussed above, this involves determining whether it was a purpose 
of the legislation that a breach of a particular requirement should result in invalidity:190  
[A]s Project Blue Sky emphasized, [whether the issue of reasons is a condition precedent to the 
exercise of power under section 501] depends upon the construction of the Act to determine whether 
it was a purpose of the Act that an act done or not done, in breach of the provision, should be invalid. 
The application of Project Blue Sky test necessarily implies that no inconsistency arises between the 
no-invalidity clause and the requirements under the act in question. Indeed, in Palme the majority said 
as much.191 Justice McHugh arrived at the same conclusion.192 His Honour found that the main question 
was whether it was the purpose of the Migration Act that the breach of the requirement spelled invalidity 
for the decision.193 His Honour’s conclusion was commensurate with the majority, the failure to provide 
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reasons did not invalidate the Minister’s decision to cancel the visa, but review for jurisdictional error 
arising on other grounds was available.194  
Dissenting in Palme, Kirby J outlined an interesting perspective. His Honour raised the question of 
whether no-invalidity clauses were unconstitutional.195 This question was not raised in argument or 
addressed by the majority and Kirby J himself did not answer it. His Honour only raised the point, 
observing that an enactment, such as s 501G(4) of the Migration Act, might raise a question of 
constitutional validity because of its attempt in ‘undiscriminating terms to uphold a decision made by a 
Minister in apparent non-compliance with requirements stated in some detail by the Parliament.’196 
Justice Kirby left the question unresolved.  
The view that the requirement of the Minister to provide reasons became inessential for the validity of 
the decision because of s 501G(4) was, according to Kirby J, incorrect. Justice Kirby concluded that 
the rights of the German national were to be determined by reference to the decision of the Minister, 
until such time as that decision was reviewed.197 This view was similar to a previous decision of the 
High Court, where McHugh and Gaudron JJ had taken a similar view of s 69 of the Migration Act in 
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (‘Miah’).198 Ultimately, 
notwithstanding the no-invalidity clause in s 501G(4), Kirby J found that jurisdictional error arose from 
the failure to give reasons, because without reasons, it was only a small step to conclude that the 
Minister had failed to take into account considerations necessary for the making of a lawful decision.199 
3 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Pty Ltd 
The same sections that were considered in Richard Walter again came before the High Court in Futuris. 
That is, the broad no-invalidity clause in s 175, and ss 175A and 177(1) of the Tax Act. The allegation 
in this case was that the Commissioner had fallen into jurisdictional error by not acting bona fide in the 
income tax assessment process and had ‘double counted’ in the application of various anti-avoidance 
provisions. Futuris sought review through Part IVC of the Tax Admin Act but also sought judicial 
review of the Commissioner’s assessment.  
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The majority gave effect to the no-invalidity clause in s 175. The High Court held that ‘[w]here section 
175 applies errors do not go to jurisdiction and therefore do not attract a remedy under section 75(v).’200 
Determining whether a breach of a particular statutory requirement meant that the decision of the 
Commissioner was invalid, was to be determined by the test applied in Project Blue Sky:201 
[T]he question for the present case is whether it is a purpose of the [Tax Act] that a failure by the 
Commissioner in the process of assessment to comply with provisions of the [Tax Act] renders the 
assessment invalid; in determining the legislative purpose regard must be had to the language of the 
relevant provisions and the scope and purpose of the statute. 
Essentially, the Court read ss 175 and 177 of the Tax Act to mean that no invalidity could be founded 
on the basis of a failure to comply with the requirements of the Tax Act, but a taxpayer who wanted to 
challenge the decision could do so under the Part IVC proceedings in the Tax Admin Act.202  
This gave virtually full effect to the broad no-invalidity clause, the practical effect of which was to 
circumvent the High Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v).203 The majority rejected the argument that s 175 
was a privative clause and observed that no inconsistency actually arose between that section and the 
requirements under the Tax Act.204 Reliance was placed on the judgment of Dawson J in Richard Walter 
and the observation his Honour made that without that inconsistency there is no need for the 
reconciliation of the kind that was necessary in Hickman; or, in Plaintiff S157.205 However, the majority 
recognised that for the protection of s 175 to be enlivened the Commissioner needed to make an 
‘assessment’. ‘Tentative’ or ‘purported’ assessments, or assessments not made bona fide were not 
assessments that attracted the protection of s 175.206 So, the no-invalidity clause still had its limits.  
Once again, Kirby J drew attention to the fact that no question had been raised about the constitutional 
validity of the no-invalidity clause.207 Justice Kirby outlined two issues that his Honour believed were 
of concern regarding the operation of both ss 175 and 177 of the Tax Act. The first was the constitutional 
validity of those sections.208 Second, whether there needed to be more than legal error and whether such 
an error took the Commissioner outside his lawful jurisdiction and power.209 Justice Kirby did not 
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address either question because they did not form part of the record.210 He did, however, refer to s 175 
as a ‘privative type provision’,211 which is indicative of his Honour’s previous treatment of no-invalidity 
clauses in general. 
D What are the limits beyond which a ‘no-invalidity’ clause cannot reach? 
The essential question, in light of the High Court’s willingness to give effect to no-invalidity clauses, 
is what are the limits beyond which they cannot reach? In Futuris, s 175 of the Tax Act was considered 
to operate only insofar as there was something that answered the statutory description of an 
‘assessment’.212 Its operation did not extend to ‘purported’ or ‘tentative’ assessments, or assessments 
that were not made bona fide.213 However, the clause was otherwise effective to preserve assessments 
outside of the Part IVC proceedings in the Tax Admin Act from invalidity arising from a breach of 
statutory requirements. 
Ultimately, those rights under Part IVC of the Tax Admin Act provided extensive opportunity for the 
correction of legal errors. In Futuris, the majority read s 175 in conjunction with s 177 and concluded 
that the validity of an assessment was not affected by any failure to adhere to the requirements under 
the Tax Act. A dissatisfied taxpayer could appeal an assessment under Part IVC of the Tax Admin 
Act.214 That finding led to the conclusion that where s 175 applied, errors in the process of assessment 
did not go to jurisdiction and no remedy under s 75(v) was available.215 If no such appeal and review 
rights existed would the provision have had the same effect? If no-invalidity clauses are effective at 
circumventing the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review, then the claimed protection it 
offers to the rule of law is insignificant. In Chapter III it will be demonstrated that the High Court looks 
to substance and not form when asking the question of whether its jurisdiction under s 75(v) has been 
impeded. No-invalidity clauses circumvent this jurisdiction, which appears to make it difficult to 
reconcile the decisions of Futuris and Palme with the jurisprudence on s 75(v) more broadly. 
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E Concluding Remarks 
Judicial consideration of privative clauses has significantly informed our understanding of legislative 
restrictions on judicial review and the general scope of s 75(v). The jurisprudence surrounding privative 
clauses and the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review is essential reading for understanding 
how no-invalidity clauses have been interpreted and how those clauses interact with the minimum 
provision of judicial review. With the decision in Futuris, the High Court has indicated an intention to 
give effect to broad no-invalidity clauses on the basis that no inconsistency, of the nature that arises 
with privative clauses, exists. Justice Kirby, on a number of occasions, did raise concern over whether 
no-invalidity clauses are consistent with the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review at all, a 
concern which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, his Honour’s concerns may be well 
placed, but ultimately the consistency of no-invalidity clauses with s 75(v) will be a question of 
substance and degree. 
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    NO-INVALIDITY CLAUSES AND SECTION 75(V) 
A Introduction 
When the High Court handed down its decision in Plaintiff S157, it was clear that the Court would 
continue to jealously guard its jurisdiction to review for jurisdictional error. The recognition of an 
entrenched minimum provision of judicial review left commentators scrambling to discern how the 
extent of this minimum provision was to be delineated.216 The High Court did very little to assist 
them.217 Since then, the Court has dealt with a number of significant judicial review cases and has 
repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the entrenchment of a minimum provision of judicial review.218 
However, the precise underlying approach that informs the scope of this minimum provision remains 
murky. Some insight into its operation has been revealed by the Court’s willingness to look to substance 
over form when determining if a legislative restriction on judicial review infringes upon s 75(v).219 This 
will be explored in Part C of this chapter. For the interpretation of no-invalidity clauses, the substance 
over form approach is significant. The practical effect of a no-invalidity clause, in circumventing the 
High Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v), may in substance impede the entrenched minimum provision 
of judicial review. 
In Futuris the Court did not consider this question, but acknowledged that a broad no-invalidity clause 
did have its limits. To understand these limits the scope of the entrenched minimum provision of judicial 
review must be understood. This chapter will deal with, first, whether no-invalidity clauses are 
expressly inconsistent with s 75(v). Second, it will demonstrate, with case examples, that the High Court 
has consistently applied an approach to legislative restrictions on judicial review that looks to substance 
over form. However, the Court has shown a reluctance to treat every statutory device that appears to, 
in substance, prevent the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v) as invalid. For example, in 
Futuris and Palme. The question of whether a legislative restriction on judicial review interferes with s 
75(v) in substance will depend on the Court’s understanding of the scope of the minimum provision of 
judicial review.  
B Are no-invalidity clauses expressly inconsistent with section 75(v)? 
The question of whether no-invalidity clauses are inconsistent with s 75(v) can be disposed of swiftly. 
Section 75(v) is concerned only with a grant of jurisdiction. The High Court is vested with original 
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jurisdiction to hear applications for the constitutional writs of prohibition and mandamus, and for 
injunction.220 This grant of jurisdiction is not concerned with the principles of substantive law upon 
which it is to be exercised.221 In Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte,222 Dixon J pointed out the 
importance of understanding the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and the manner of its 
exercise.223 Cognisance of this distinction reveals that no express inconsistency exists. No-invalidity 
clauses operate upon the substantive law and not the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue the 
constitutional writs. This can be better understood if contrasted with privative clauses.  
A privative clause specifically targets the jurisdiction of the Court to conduct judicial review. To the 
extent that it precludes review for jurisdictional error, a privative clause is expressly inconsistent with 
the grant of jurisdiction under s 75(v).224 In contrast, no-invalidity clauses target substantive 
requirements under the legislation that empower the decision maker.225 The result is that there is no 
direct inconsistency between no-invalidity clauses and s 75(v). The case law reflects this position. In 
Richard Walter, Deane and Gaudron JJ said that the operation of s 175 of the Tax Act was only 
concerned with the substantive law in the exercise of the Commissioner’s jurisdiction.226 The same 
observation was made by the majority in Futuris.227 The operation of a no-invalidity clause does not 
directly impede the jurisdiction of the Court to conduct judicial review. Consequently, no express 
inconsistency with s 75(v) arises. 
C Practical effect: substance over form 
The High Court has indicated an intention to approach legislative restrictions on judicial review, in light 
of s 75(v), with substance as its focus. As recently as last year, the Court declared that the question of 
interference with its jurisdiction under s 75(v) was one of ‘substance and degree’.228 The following 
cases demonstrate that the High Court has applied this approach to various forms of legislative 
restrictions on judicial review. The first case, Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border 
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Protection (‘Graham’),229 deals with a substantive restriction on judicial review presented by powers 
to withhold evidence.  
1 Graham v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection 
Section 503A of the Migration Act provided that the Minister was not required to furnish information 
associated with a s 501 character cancellation, if that information was communicated by a gazetted 
agency on condition of its confidentiality.230 The Plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the 
Minister cancelling his visa under s 501 of the Migration Act. The Plaintiff also argued that s 503A was 
invalid. Of the two grounds of invalidity advanced by the Plaintiff, the second is of particular relevance 
here. The Plaintiff argued that by limiting the right or ability of an aggrieved person to seek relief under 
s 75(v), s 503A was inconsistent with the place and purpose of s 75(v). The argument was successful. 
The High Court issued the writs of prohibition and certiorari. Crucially, the majority stated in emphatic 
terms that the question of whether a provision in an act transgresses the limitation imposed by s 75(v) 
is one of substance and degree.231 The majority said the following:232 
The question of whether or not a law transgresses [the limitation imposed by section 75(v)] is one 
of substance, and therefore of degree. To answer it requires an examination not only of the legal 
operation of the law but also of the practical impact of the law on the ability of a court, through the 
application of the judicial process, to discern and declare whether or not the conditions of and 
constraints on the lawful exercise of the power conferred on an officer have been observed in a 
particular case. 
The majority, made up of Kiefel CJ and Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ, applied the 
rationale of Plaintiff S157. Their Honours concluded that the provision in s 503A, enabling the Minister 
to withhold confidential information, specifically undermined the ability of the High Court to conduct 
judicial review under s 75(v).233  
Allowing the Minister to withhold key information, upon which the decision was made, the section 
imposed a rigid and inflexible limit on the Court’s ability to obtain evidence specifically relevant to the 
question of whether the Minister had acted within the power conferred by the Migration Act. In this 
way, s 503A curtailed the capacity of the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under s 75(v) and the section 
was invalid to the extent that it applied to prevent the Minister from divulging information to the High 
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Court when exercising its jurisdiction under s 75(v).234 This rationale found some basis in the Court’s 
earlier decision of Bodruddaza v The Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs 
(‘Bodruddaza’).235 
2 Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs 
A mandatory time limitation under s 486A of the Migration Act prohibited application to the High 
Court for review of a migration decision if it was after 84 days of the decision having been made. 
Section 486A was a ‘time clause’. Time clauses limit the opportunity of persons affected by decisions 
to seek judicial review. The provision also prevented, under subsection (2), the issuing of remedies by 
the Court if the application was made out of time.236   
Neither the Minister, nor any of the intervening parties, challenged the assertion that s 486A would be 
invalid if it operated to direct the manner in which the judicial power of the Commonwealth should be 
exercised. Justice Callinan had previously held s 486A invalid in Plaintiff S157.237 His Honour held that 
the section was ‘in substance a prohibition’ on the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under s 75(v).238 The 
question for the High Court on this occasion was, to what extent can Parliament prevent access to s 
75(v) without treading on the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review?239 
The majority reaffirmed that it was beyond the power of the legislature, through the enactment of 
ordinary legislation, to limit the right or ability of a person to seek relief under s 75(v).240 Their Honours 
said that if a legislative device was inconsistent with the place and purpose of s 75(v) it would infringe 
upon the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review.241 The majority remarked that legislation 
would be inconsistent with s 75(v) if it were to ‘so curtail or limit the right or ability of applicants to 
seek relief under section 75(v) as to be inconsistent with the place of that provision in the constitutional 
structure.’242 The mandatory time frame was not expressly inconsistent with section 75(v). However, in 
effect, s 486A made it impossible for the Plaintiff, who had only a limited understanding of English, to 
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seek relief under s 75(v). Section 75(v) gives textual reinforcement to the rule of law and operates, as 
an accountability measure, to ensure officers of the Commonwealth take decisions according to law.243 
A provision that limits the timeframe within which to apply for judicial review under s 75(v), such that 
for all intents and purposes review is prevented from taking place, is inconsistent with the accountability 
function of s 75(v). On that basis, s 486A was declared invalid.244  
The threads of this reasoning can be seen echoed in Graham. Indeed, in Graham the Court reasoned 
that the imposition of a blanket and inflexible time limit was analogous to the inability of the Court to 
access evidence relating to the review process.245 The basis of invalidity was that the practical effect of 
the time clause was to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to review a particular migration decision for 
jurisdictional error.246 In both cases the problem arose from the deliberate effort by parliament to 
circumvent the constitutionally entrenched jurisdiction of the High Court. As a result, the provisions 
are invalid to the extent that they do so. It is not permissible for the parliament to do indirectly, what it 
cannot do directly.247 It is unclear where Futuris and Palme sit in relation to the cases described. No-
invalidity clauses are practical inhibitors of judicial review and yet the Court has so far seen fit to give 
them virtually full effect. There is an apparent inconsistency in the High Court’s approach to the 
confidentiality clause in Graham, the time clause in Bodrudazza and the no-invalidity clauses in Palme 
and Futuris. However, Bodruddaza and Graham are to be contrasted with Plaintiff M61/2010E v The 
Commonwealth (‘Plaintiff M61’).248  
3 Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth 
In Plaintiff M61, the High Court was asked, amongst other questions, to consider whether s 46A(7) of 
the Migration Act infringed upon the jurisdiction conferred by s 75(v).249 Section 46A relevantly 
empowered the Minister under subsection (2) to exclude an unauthorized maritime arrival (or, offshore 
entry person) from the application of subsection (1).250 Subsection (1) prevented the unauthorized 
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maritime arrival from applying for a visa.251 Section 46A(7) made the decision under s 46A(2) of 
whether to consider allowing an unauthorized maritime arrival to apply for a visa discretionary.252 At a 
superficial level this would appear to circumvent the jurisdiction to grant mandamus under s 75(v) 
because there is no duty for which mandamus will compel performance. The Plaintiff’s argument 
reflected this point. It closely echoed remarks made by the majority in Plaintiff S157.253  
It was argued that s 46A(7) effectively conferred upon the Minister an unfettered and unreviewable 
statutory power to decide whether or not an offshore entry person could make a valid visa application.254 
This, it was suggested, lacked the required content to constitute an exercise of legislative power. But 
for the operation of subsection (7), the Minister would have had a duty to consider exercising the power 
and could exercise that power if it was ‘in the public interest’ to do so.255 The existence of subsection 
(7) effectively circumvented the High Court’s jurisdiction to compel the exercise of the power through 
the writ of mandamus, suggesting that the power had no judicially enforceable limitations. On that 
account, the provision was alleged to be inconsistent with the place and purpose of s 75(v) in the 
constitutional structure.256  
This argument resonates deeply with the subject matter at the centre of this thesis. Despite the obvious 
differences between the exercise of a discretionary power and a no-invalidity clause, it is possible to 
draw an analogy between them. Section 46A(7) is a plenary provision.257 It shares a close resemblance 
to a no-invalidity clause.258 Unlike the previous two examples provided in this part, the discretionary 
power more closely resembles the no-invalidity clause because the focus of its operation is on the 
substantive law to be applied, rather than on the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court resoundingly 
rejected the Plaintiff’s argument. The relevant content of the provision was expressed as the Minister 
                                               
251 Ibid s 46A(1).  
252 Ibid s 46A(7). 
253 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 512-13 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ): the majority 
made remarks about open ended discretions and that they may lack the character of a law that is amenable to 
judicial enforcement.  
254 Plaintiff M61 (2010) 243 CLR 316, 336 [16] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell 
JJ). 
255 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A(2). 
256 Plaintiff M61 (2010) 243 CLR 316, 346-7 [56]-[57] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ). 
257 A plenary provision is a provision that expands the power of a decision maker by removing substantive 
restrictions on the exercise of the power, for example, by providing that non-compliance with the requirements 
will not invalidate the decision (no-invalidity clause), specifically removes a substantive ground of review, or 
empowers a decision maker to excise a power that is beyond the ‘subject matter, scope and purpose’ of the Act in 
question, for discussion see generally, Bateman, above n 6, 466-7.  
258 Burton Crawford, above n 86, 89. 
47 
having discretion, that is ‘the Minister may… but need not consider whether to’ exercise the power.259 
The Court was unanimous in its decision, stating:260 
[The] grant of power on the terms set out in s 46A(7) does not clash with s 75(v), or with its place 
and purpose in the Constitution. Maintenance of the capacity to enforce the limits on power does 
not entail that consideration of the exercise of a power must always be amenable to enforcement... 
If the power is exercised, then the exercise of the power is capable of being subject to review under s 
75(v).261 However, the decision of whether or not to exercise the power cannot be the subject of review 
and no writ of mandamus can issue to compel it.262 
Despite a clear emphasis on substance over form, the High Court rejected the suggestion that such a 
broad discretion precluded the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under s 75(v). The power in question is 
only the discretion of whether to consider exercising a statutory power. All s 46A(7) did was preclude 
the Court, indirectly, from compelling the consideration of the exercise of the statutory power. It did 
not prevent the Court from reviewing the exercise of the statutory power itself.263 The requirement 
imposed by the place of s 75(v) in the constitutional structure and purpose of s 75(v) as an accountability 
measure, is that the exercise of Commonwealth administrative power be amenable to judicial oversight 
and that the grant of power by parliament have limitations capable of enforcement.264 In this case, the 
fact that the Minister could exercise his/her discretion as to whether to consider the exercise of the 
power said nothing about the supervision of the power itself. Accordingly, there was no question of the 
Minister being able to exercise power that had no oversight for accountability purposes. The result, was 
that s 46A(7) made no intrusion on s 75(v) in form or in substance, because it was not inconsistent with 
the place and purpose of s 75(v). 
D Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that whilst no-invalidity clauses are not expressly inconsistent 
with s 75(v) of the Constitution, the question is one of substance and degree. The Court has shown a 
reluctance to treat every statutory device that appears to, in substance, prevent the exercise of the High 
Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v) as invalid. This raises the question of how much interference is to be 
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permitted. Consideration of the Court’s treatment of s 175 of the Tax Act in Futuris, in comparison 
with the case illustrations in this part, indicates that the approach is variable depending on the statutory 
context. There is an underlying approach that is guiding the Court in making its assessment of whether 
a particular provision intrudes upon the minimum provision of judicial review. In the following two 
chapters it will be demonstrated that this underlying principle is the rule of law, in concert with a broader 
approach to administrative accountability.  
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   EXPLORING THE SCOPE OF THE ENTRENCHED MINIMUM PROVISION OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A Introductory Remarks 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight a principled approach that can explain the High Court’s view of 
the scope of the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review. Once this is achieved, a more 
complete picture of the Court’s treatment of no-invalidity clauses will be attainable. Parliament cannot 
revoke the jurisdiction to grant relief under s 75(v) where jurisdictional error is found.265 Accordingly, 
this chapter will first consider the capacity of jurisdictional error to inform the scope of the entrenched 
minimum provision of judicial review. However, jurisdictional error is undefinable in substance and 
circular in its application, making it ill-equipped for the task. The inquiry will then be directed to the 
rule of law, because of its central place in s 75(v) jurisprudence. The need to prevent the exercise of 
arbitrary, or unconstrained administrative decision making is a key rationale underlying the place and 
purpose of s 75(v) in the Constitution. Consideration of the rule of law, to which s 75(v) gives effect,266 
in concert with a broader approach to administrative accountability, has a much greater capacity for 
lending meaning to the minimum provision of judicial review. The approach is not perfect, it lacks the 
clarity and definition of a doctrinal approach. However, it provides the best explanation of the High 
Court’s jurisprudence on the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review so far. 
B The role of jurisdictional error in informing the scope of section 75(v) 
In attempting to delineate the scope of the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review, 
jurisdictional error must be central to any discussion. Its importance as a constitutional concept has 
been underlined by Plaintiff S157. However, its use as a principle upon which to ground an 
understanding of the scope of the minimum provision of judicial review is severely limited. For the 
jurisdiction to issue the constitutional writs to be enlivened jurisdictional error must be established.267 
In this way, jurisdictional error operates as central to the inquiry. However, jurisdictional error is not a 
ground of review, rather, it is the outcome of successfully establishing a ground of review. Mark 
Aronson keenly observed that jurisdictional error is a means of stating a conclusion with respect to 
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legality, rather than a test for legality itself.268 Similar observations have been made by Basten269 and 
Leeming JJ,270 and Charles Noonan.271 Relying upon jurisdictional error, although central to the inquiry 
as the key unifying concept of Australian Administrative law,272 will lead our inquiry astray, principally, 
because of its conclusory status.  
There are two key reasons why jurisdictional error provides limited assistance in clarifying the limits 
of the constitutionally entrenched provision for judicial review. Each is related to the other, but it is 
helpful to consider them separately. First, relying upon jurisdictional error to explain the High Court’s 
understanding of the scope of the minimum provision of judicial review leads to the conclusion that 
some of the grounds of review are themselves entrenched. This conclusion is unworkable. The grounds 
giving rise to jurisdictional error are not closed273 and it is firmly accepted that some grounds, for 
example procedural fairness, can be excluded by clear words.274 It is unclear which grounds would be 
constitutionally protected and which would not. The result is a principle of unidentifiable and 
undefinable content. Second, identifying jurisdictional error involves a process of statutory 
interpretation that depends entirely on the statute empowering the decision maker. This necessitates that 
the legislature could circumvent s 75(v). A position that has been demonstrated as untenable. 
1 Unidentifiable and undefinable content 
In order for jurisdictional error to provide the foundation from which to delineate the scope of the 
minimum content of judicial review, it must contain identifiable and definable content itself. 
Jurisdictional error hinges upon the success of a ground of review.275 For example, jurisdictional error 
will be established if there is denial of procedural fairness, a failure to consider mandatory relevant 
considerations, unreasonableness and so on.276 If jurisdictional error is the informing principle, the 
question giving rise to the jurisdictional error, i.e. the ground of review, must form part of the inquiry.  
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As Leighton McDonald has correctly observed, if none of the grounds of review are subject to 
constitutional protection, then jurisdictional error can be excluded entirely and there is no content to the 
minimum provision of judicial review in s 75(v).277 Conversely, it is equally impossible to conclude 
that each of the grounds of judicial review find protection from legislative exclusion in s 75(v). As 
mentioned in the introduction to this part, there has always been a firmly accepted view that procedural 
fairness can be excluded by clear words.278 Likewise, in Palme the High Court was willing to accept 
that no jurisdictional error could arise specifically from the failure to provide reasons on account of s 
501G(4).279 Where, then, is the line to be drawn? It is for the legislature to shape the jurisdiction of the 
decision maker. In attempting to resolve the problem of identifying which grounds were entrenched, 
and which were not, Jeremy Kirk distinguished between grounds of review arising from statute and at 
Common law.280 However, this is liable to raise more questions. McDonald highlighted the difficulty 
associated with drawing such a distinction, pointing out that there is an ongoing debate over whether 
procedural fairness arises from the Common law or from statute.281 On the basis of these observations, 
it is ahistorical to conclude that the substantive grounds of review are themselves entrenched in the 
constitution. 
McDonald added that the use of jurisdictional error as the defining principle would leave judges with 
significant discretion in the absence of any guidance from the Constitution.282 These are important 
observations. Jurisdictional error is difficult to pin down. It is entirely dependent on the statutory context 
and, as Basten J has observed, the grounds giving rise to jurisdictional error have expanded much more 
than traditionally contemplated.283 The grounds of review are themselves not principles of law capable 
of easy and consistent application.284 Anchoring our understanding of the scope of the minimum 
provision of judicial review to jurisdictional error is problematic and raises more questions than it 
answers.  
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2 Statutory interpretation 
The second major difficulty associated with the jurisdictional error approach arises from the statutory 
context. Jurisdictional error is based on a process of statutory construction.285 It is determined by 
reference to the statute that empowered the decision. Accordingly, classifying an error as jurisdictional 
is a conclusion reached by interpreting the boundaries of the decision maker’s power. The result is that 
the legislature can circumvent the jurisdiction of the High Court by classifying requirements under the 
act in question as non-jurisdictional. This is the no-invalidity clause problem. The emphasis is on form, 
but the High Court is approaching the question as one of substance and degree.286 
Will Bateman, on the scope and content of s 75(v), made the observation that if no-invalidity clauses 
are given full effect they will have the practical impact of ‘hollowing out’ the constitutional concept of 
jurisdictional error of any meaning.287 The same argument was made by Charles Noonan.288 If the 
legislature can confer power without jurisdictional limitations then s 75(v) is reduced to insignificance. 
Concern over the potential for parliament to exclude jurisdictional error by simply widening the 
jurisdiction of the decision maker to the nth degree was discussed in Plaintiff S157.289 The majority 
indicated that giving such an open ended discretion ‘might well be ineffective’.290 Discretion in such 
broad terms would seem to lack the requisite quality of a ‘law’ and connection with a head of power 
under the Constitution.291 The reservation to the High Court of a constitutional jurisdiction to ensure 
that Commonwealth officers obey the law necessarily confines the power of Parliament to avoid or 
confine judicial review.292 The Court made it clear that efforts to circumvent s 75(v) would be 
ineffective.293 This is not surprising, if they were effective then the accountability function of s 75(v) 
and its significance at giving effect to the rule of law would be insignificant. 
The inquiry is thus led back to the ultimate question, what are the limits beyond which a no-invalidity 
clause cannot reach? These limits must exist. In Futuris, despite the broad ranging and explicit nature 
of s 175 of the Tax Act, the Court concluded that on its proper construction s 175 did not extend to 
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preserve decisions made in deliberate breach of the requirements under the Tax Act.294 Those errors 
remained jurisdictional. Reliance is placed on jurisdictional error as the answer to the inquiry, but it 
cannot explain the Court’s underlying approach to the interpretation of legislative restrictions on 
judicial review by itself. As a basis for determining the scope of the entrenched minimum provision of 
judicial review, jurisdictional error raises more questions than it answers. Jurisdictional error is, for this 
reason, incapable of providing a basis upon which to rationalize the High Court’s understanding of s 
75(v) and the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review. The significance of s 75(v) as an 
accountability mechanism and implementation of the rule of law in Australia, may succeed where 
jurisdictional error has proved inadequate.  
C The rule of law and section 75(v) 
Section 75(v) gives effect to the rule of law.295 In Plaintiff S157, the majority made this point by 
emphasizing the role played by s 75(v) in giving textual reinforcement to what Dixon J famously said 
about the rule of law in Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth.296 That is, that the rule of 
law is an assumption upon which the Constitution is based.297 In Plaintiff S157, the Court drew upon 
the place and purpose of s 75(v), to highlight the fact that the section gave expression to the rule of law 
in the Constitution. In this context, as indicated in the introduction, the rule of law refers to the 
requirement that all people, including government, are subject to law. The concept is often attributed to 
A V Dicey. Dicey observed that ‘every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or collector 
of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other 
citizen.’298 The broader content of the rule of law principle is highly contested.299 The High Court has 
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said that it is reluctant to inform hard edged principles from such a contestable notion.300 However, the 
Court has made it clear that principles and concepts derived from the rule of law form an assumption 
against which the Constitution must be read and applied.301 The rule of law may legitimately be ‘taken 
into account’ when interpreting the Constitution.302  
Justice Gaudron’s statement in Corporation of Enfield City Council v Development Assessment 
Commission (‘Enfield City Council’),303 is a cogent articulation of the rule of law principle. Her Honour 
said that ‘[t]hose exercising executive and administrative powers are as much subject to the law as those 
who are or may be affected by the exercise of those powers.’304 Judicial Review is concerned with the 
enforcement of this notion of the rule of law.305 In Church of Scientology v Woodward,306 Brennan J 
observed that:307 
Judicial review is neither more nor less than the enforcement of the rule of law over executive 
action; it is the means by which executive action is prevented from exceeding the powers and 
functions assigned to the executive by law and the interests of the individual are protected 
accordingly. 
Judicial review ensures that decisions are taken within the power conferred.308 This is the enforcement 
of the rule of law, to which s 75(v) gives effect by ensuring that the High Court has original jurisdiction 
to issue the constitutional writs.  
The possibility that the rule of law could provide guidance to understanding the scope of the entrenched 
minimum provision of judicial review has been advanced by some commentators.309  As Jeremy Kirk 
correctly observes, the statement by the majority in Plaintiff S157 that ‘[s 75(v)] is a means of ensuring 
to all people affected that officers of the Commonwealth obey the law and neither exceed nor neglect 
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their jurisdiction which the law confers upon them’310 is a statement about the principle of legality. Kirk 
understands the principle of legality to be the principle enunciated by Gaudron J, outlined above.311 In 
Plaintiff S157, the High Court tied this principle directly to s 75(v) and the entrenched minimum 
provision of judicial review. 
Even without constitutional considerations, supervisory jurisdiction was a characteristic of superior 
courts. A privative clause has always had only limited success in inhibiting that jurisdiction.312 It is 
essential, according to Kirby J, that courts retain their jurisdiction to review for breaches of 
‘fundamental requirements’ because the rule of law:313 
[I]mposes ultimate limits on the power of any legislature to render government action, federal, state 
or territory, immune from conformity to the law and scrutiny by the courts against that basal 
standard.  
A similar point was made by the Court in Plaintiff S157,314 and again in Graham.315 Section 75(v) 
secures this most basic element of the rule of law in the Constitution.316 The purpose of s 75(v) is to 
assure to all people affected that officers of the Commonwealth obey the law and neither exceed nor 
neglect the jurisdiction conferred upon them.317 Once the centrality of the rule of law to s 75(v) 
jurisprudence is fully appreciated it provides a backdrop from which to draw out the principles that 
inform the High Court’s approach to legislative restrictions on judicial review.  
It is important to note, however, that the rule of law itself is insufficient to provide the basis upon which 
to draw an understanding of the scope of the minimum provision of judicial review. The rule of law 
provides an incomplete picture. The enforcement of the law is the rationale for correcting jurisdictional 
error.318 The inquiry ultimately leads back to the concept of jurisdictional error and is vulnerable to the 
criticisms highlighted Part B above. The reasoning is circular in the sense that it does not provide the 
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broader understanding of s 75(v)’s function that enables the scope of the entrenched minimum provision 
of judicial review to be understood.  
The High Court’s approach to determining when there has been an intrusion upon the minimum 
provision of judicial review cannot be explained by the rule of law alone because the emphasis would 
be too heavily on form. In Bodruddaza, the Court indicated that it would invalidate or ‘read-down’ a 
no-invalidity clause that authorised the fraudulent or deliberate breach of legislative requirements.319 
As discussed above, in Futuris, the Court interpreted s 175 of the Tax Act, as broad as it was, to still 
not extend to fraud or deliberate maladministration.320 The High Court is informing its understanding 
of s 75(v) and the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review by reference to something other 
than simply the requirement that government is subject to the law. It is insufficient as a single principle 
to explain the Court’s approach to the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review. However, the 
rule of law rationale as the key purpose of s 75(v) can provide the much-needed substance to explain 
the Court’s rationale, if it is understood in concert with a broader approach to administrative 
accountability.  
D Consideration of the broader context of administrative accountability 
The role of judicial review is to restrain administrative decision makers from arbitrary or unlimited 
exercises of power. The High Court has indicated that it will invalidate or ‘read-down’ legislative 
provisions that are inconsistent with the place and purpose of s 75(v) in the constitutional structure.321 
The place and purpose of s 75(v) is informed by the underlying rationale of administrative 
accountability and need to protect people from arbitrary, or unconstrained power.  
1 A broader approach to administrative accountability  
The rule of law is under threat, in this context, when there is no way of enforcing the limits on the 
exercise of executive power. There is no strict ‘right’ to judicial review, the role of judicial review is 
only to ensure the exercise of power is taken in accordance with the law so enacted.322 Parliament 
determines the limits of the law to be applied and the High Court enforces those limits in accordance 
with the expressed intention of Parliament. In this way, judicial review is not necessarily concerned 
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with the protection of individual rights. In Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin,323 Brennan J said that the 
‘scope of judicial review should be defined not in terms of the protection of individual interests but in 
terms of the extent of power and the legality of its exercise.’324 Judicial review serves to protect the 
individual against exercises of power outside the limits set by Parliament. 
In Kirk, the majority placed emphasis on the need to avoid ‘islands of power’ immune from supervision 
and restraint.325 A similar point was made by Heydon J,326 and both were in the context of the need to 
avoid the potential for ‘distorted’ positions.327 These distorted positions are positions adopted by 
tribunals or quasi-judicial entities that are preoccupied with correcting particular mischief.328 
Specialised tribunals without judicial oversight are, as Heydon J observed in reliance upon Louis Jaffe, 
likely to find that mischief.329 Accordingly, the removal of supervision by superior courts is liable to 
encourage the development of distorted positions and the arbitrary exercise of power.330 On the scope 
of s 75(v), Will Bateman referred to the need to avoid ‘unlimited’ or ‘arbitrary’ exercises of power.331 
Unrestrained power and the potential for arbitrariness were also described as giving rise to ‘islands of 
power’ in Probuild.332 
The creation of pockets of unsupervised power provides a gateway to the exercise of arbitrary, and 
ultimately dictatorial power.333 The need for supervision in the maintenance of the rule of law is central 
to the accountability function of s 75(v). It is in this context that the centrality and importance of 
jurisdictional error becomes clear. There is a difference between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
errors of law in that, if not subject to review, the former reflect the exercise of arbitrary power but the 
latter do not.334 The supremacy of the rule of law is designed to exclude the existence of arbitrariness 
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or prerogative.335 Precluding the review of a non-jurisdictional error of law prevents the assessment of 
whether the decision was ‘regular and according to law’.336 Review in a case of non-jurisdictional error 
of law is a review of the legality of the process of exercising power, rather than reviewing whether the 
authority to exercise the power exists.337 Non-jurisdictional error of law is an error of law within the 
confines of the power conferred upon the decision maker. The alternative, exercise of power outside 
the law as set down by the legislature, is an exercise of arbitrary power and accordingly, a jurisdictional 
error.338 It is this distinction that gives rise to the increased need for the availability of review for 
decisions that are the subject of jurisdictional error. The absence of the ability to review decisions for 
jurisdictional error is inconsistent with the rule of law in the context of administrative accountability 
because an ‘island of power’ is created.339 
Notably, however, judicial review is not the only means of ensuring that decision makers exercise their 
jurisdiction within the limits of the power conferred. The constitutional jurisdiction does not exist for 
the purpose of enabling the judiciary to impose upon the executive branch of government its idea of 
good administration.340 The rule of law is not undermined by the mere limitation of appeals or judicial 
review. Appeals are frequently limited and/or confined, often limited by particular criteria because there 
are good policy reasons to encourage finality.341 Accordingly, the very fact that a no-invalidity clause 
indirectly prevents access to judicial review is not, of itself, offensive to the rule of law. The concern 
arises in circumstances where there are inadequate means of enforcing the limits of the jurisdiction 
conferred upon the decision maker in general. 
Section 75(v) gives effect to the rule of law, which can be understood to be the requirement that 
government must act according to law. This idea, considered in concert with the broader context of 
administrative accountability, can provide a normative basis within which to ground an understanding 
of the High Court’s approach to no-invalidity clauses. Ultimately, the approach hinges on the alternative 
arrangements for ensuring oversight of administrative decision making. The place and purpose of s 
75(v) will only be interfered with when there are inadequate means of ensuring that islands of power 
are not created by decision makers. This will not occur where there are alternative mechanisms in place 
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to allow for review. For example, a piece of legislation might provide for extensive avenues of appeal 
and review in its own right,. Alternatively, if particular grounds of review are excluded then 
jurisdictional error is liable to be identified on other grounds. It may also be the case that certain 
requirements under this hypothetical act, are designated as not being ‘mandatory’ or ‘essential’ to the 
validity of a decision, this does not preclude review of other requirements or on other grounds.  
In Plaintiff M61, there was no question of the place and purpose of s 75(v) being under threat because 
the choice to exercise the power was at the Minister’s discretion. If the power was exercised there were 
oversight mechanisms in place, including judicial review, to ensure it was exercised within the limits 
conferred by Parliament.342 No issue of arbitrary power arose in Plaintiff M61. In contrast, in 
Bodrudazza no real mechanism for review existed once the impracticably short timeframe to seek 
judicial review had elapsed. Accordingly, the imposition of such a short time frame within which to 
apply for judicial review subverted the purpose of the remedies provided by s 75(v).343 Without it, there 
was no mechanism to ensure the decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal were taken within the power 
conferred. 
Like privative clauses, the effect of a no-invalidity clause will always be a question of statutory 
construction.344 The meaning given to a no-invalidity clause will reflect the context in which it is 
found.345 Additionally, construing a no-invalidity clause in Federal legislation must be done subject to 
the Constitution346 and will involve an application of all relevant principles of statutory construction.347 
Two key principles that must be considered are the presumption of legality and the aforementioned 
need to avoid arbitrary exercises of power. The outcome is the presumption that the Court will not read 
into legislation, in the absence of clear words to the contrary, an intention to abrogate fundamental 
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rights of preclude access to the courts to correct legal errors.348 This approach is fully explored in the 
next chapter. 
Ultimately, if adequate means of oversight exist, there will be no intrusion on the entrenched minimum 
provision of judicial review by even a broadly cast no-invalidity clause.  In such a case, the no-invalidity 
clause will be effective at indirectly preventing judicial review by bringing certain breaches of 
legislative requirements within jurisdiction. No intrusion upon the entrenched minimum provision of 
judicial review will occur in form or in substance, because there is no interference with the place and 
purpose of s 75(v) in the Constitution. A person aggrieved by the decision can seek appeal or review in 
accordance with the alternative appeal procedures provided for in the legislation.  
On the other hand, in circumstances where there are no adequate alternative avenues of review or 
appeal, the no-invalidity clause must be read subject to the entrenched minimum provision of judicial 
review. The minimum content of judicial review cannot be abrogated in substance, so the no-invalidity 
clause is ineffective to the extent that it does so. No-invalidity clauses, like privative clauses, should be 
read consistently with the Constitution if such an interpretation is available.349 For this reason they are 
liable to be interpreted differently depending on the context in which they appear. If there are no means 
of otherwise ensuring administrative accountability, preserving the place and purpose of s 75(v) will 
necessitate a narrow reading of the no-invalidity clause. Generally, this circumstance is only likely to 
arise in the context of a broad no-invalidity clause. This will be fully explored in chapter V. However, 
before moving on it is important to consider the limitations of the approach advanced in this chapter.  
2 Limitations to relying upon the broader context of administrative accountability 
The major shortcoming of the approach advanced in this chapter is that it cannot provide a methodical, 
principled approach to outlining the scope of the minimum provision of judicial review in s 75(v). The 
only way this could be achieved would be for the High Court to adopt a conception of the rule of law 
from which it could develop substantive principles of interpretation. This has significant difficulties 
because of the extent to which the rule of law is disputed beyond the base requirement of adherence to 
the law. Indeed, the Court has indicated an intention to avoid such treacherous waters.350 The High 
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Court is informing its understanding of s 75(v) and the entrenched minimum provision of judicial 
review by reference to the accountability function of s 75(v). There is difficulty associated with 
ascertaining the point at which there are inadequate alternative arrangements for the maintenance of 
accountability. This is a case by case question and will depend on the context in which the legislative 
restriction on judicial review appears.  
The process is ultimately one of statutory construction. It involves an application of key principles such 
as the presumption of legality and the need, where inconsistencies exist, for reconciliation. This will be 
properly explored in Chapter V. This does not involve the application of new principles, it involves 
applying principles of construction that judges have been applying for centuries. Judges consider, under 
the approach advanced in this thesis, the broader context of administrative accountability and make the 
judgment of whether the values associated with the rule of law are under threat. The result is an approach 
that does not provide absolute clarity as to the delineation of the boundaries of the minimum provision 
of judicial review. However, it can provide the explanation for how the High Court has approached the 
question of whether a legislative restriction on judicial review has, in substance, intruded upon its 
bounds. 
F Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated that the rule of law, in concert with a broader approach to administrative 
accountability, is capable of offering a foundation for understanding the High Court’s approach to the 
scope of the minimum provision of judicial review. In the following chapter, Chapter V, the manner in 
which this will impact the construction of no-invalidity clauses will be explored. This will provide a 
more complete picture. In essence, the scope of the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review 
extends to requiring that there will always be means of enforcing the limitations on a decision maker’s 
power. Those means need not be judicial review. The place and purpose of s 75(v) will only be impeded 
in substance where there are inadequate means of ensuring that an administrative decision maker takes 
their decision within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred upon them. 
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   AVOIDING ISLANDS OF POWER CREATED BY NO-INVALIDITY 
CLAUSES 
A Introduction 
Whether or not an administrative decision is valid will depend on whether the exercise of power falls 
within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred. A no-invalidity clause forms part of that assessment. If 
it is accepted that the rule of law, in concert with a broader approach to administrative accountability 
can inform the scope of the minimum provision of judicial review, an approach to no-invalidity clauses 
that is consistent with s 75(v) can be identified. In circumstances where a no-invalidity clause operates 
to undermine the place and purpose of s 75(v) the Court should, relying on established principles of 
statutory construction, apply a more restrictive interpretation to the clause. The presumption of legality 
has played a significant role in the interpretation of legislative restrictions on judicial review. This has 
been the case whether those restrictions were in form or in substance, and whether the errors purported 
to be protected were jurisdictional or not.351 The presumption of legality has informed what Edelman J 
described as the ‘narrow approach to construction’.352 By no means is this a new concept, but this 
language is being adopted for its clarity and simplicity. The application of this approach to privative 
clauses is well known. It is submitted that it can have a similar application to the interpretation of no-
invalidity clauses.  
The validity of decisions that are subject to no-invalidity clauses are to be approached with an 
application of the Project Blue Sky test for validity.353 The High Court in Futuris specifically excluded 
any application of the Hickman Provisos on the basis that no prima facie inconsistency between the 
clause and the legislation could be identified.354 Therefore, there was no need to consider the approach 
taken in Plaintiff S157. The question was whether it was a ‘purpose’ of the legislation that the decision 
was to be rendered invalid because of a breach of a legislative requirement. The majority of the High 
Court in Futuris that arrived at this conclusion should be understood to have applied the correct 
approach. However, a prima facie inconsistency can be said to arise if legislation contains a broad no-
invalidity clause, of the kind in Futuris, and no alternative mechanism of appeal or review. In such 
circumstances, the narrow approach to construction should apply with significant force. The narrow 
approach to construction has been a ‘working hypothesis’ of legislative restrictions on judicial 
                                               
351 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 269 [85] (Edelman J). 
352 Ibid 269 [85] (Edelman J): ‘narrow approach to construction’ is the phrase given to the judicial approach to  
privative clauses by Edelman J, it offers simplicity and clarity in application. 
353 See discussion in Chapter II, Part C.3. 
354 Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 167 [67] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
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review.355 The narrow approach to construction is a result of the need for parliament to express in clear 
words its intention to preclude access to a court to correct errors of law. It is a principle that is the 
culmination of both the presumption of legality and the rule of law’s repugnance to arbitrary and 
unconstrained exercise of power. This chapter will demonstrate that in circumstances where the place 
and purpose of s 75(v) is under threat by a broad no-invalidity clause, the narrow approach to the 
construction of the no-invalidity clause is open to the Court.  
B  The narrow approach to construction 
The narrow approach to the construction of privative clauses involves prescribing a meaning to the 
clause that is much narrower than its literal meaning, in order to reconcile an inconsistency with the 
rest of the legislation.356 There have been occasions where privative clauses have been construed so 
narrowly that the clause is left with little practical effect.357 This has been the case even where this 
conflicts with the actual expressed intention of parliament. For example, s 474 of the Migration Act in 
Plaintiff S157 was construed so narrowly as to be left with virtually no work to do.358 This was despite 
a clear indication from parliament that s 474 was designed to preclude judicial review as long as the 
decision maker adhered to the Hickman Provisos.359 Mark Aronson described s 474 as having been 
‘filleted’.360  
The rationale for the narrow approach to construction is intimately connected to the rule of law and the  
presumption of legality.361 The presumption of legality is the presumption that parliament does not 
intend to limit or revoke fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of 
                                               
355 Electrolux Home products Pty Ltd v Australian Worker’s Union (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [21] (Gleeson CJ).  
356 This approach should be recognisable as the manner in which courts have wrestled with privative clauses for 
years. The aim is to construe the clause consistently with the broader legislation, this involves applying a narrow 
construction. See chapter II, Part B for analysis of privative clauses generally. See, eg, Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 
CLR 476, 504-5 [71]-[72] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Public Service Association (SA) 
(1991) 173 CLR 132, 160 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ); Darlington Casino (1997) 191 CLR 633-635 (Gaudron and 
Gummow JJ); Hickman (1945) 70 CLR 598, 615-16 (Dixon J); R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 
387, 400 (Dixon J).  
357 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 269 [84] (Edelman J).  
358 Ronald Sackville, ‘The 2003 Term: The Inaccessible Constitution’ (2004) 27 University of New South Wales 
law Journal 66, 70; Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on ‘The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review and 
the rule of law’’(2010) 21 Public Law Review 35, 36  
359 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 September 2001, 31559 – 61 (Phillip 
Ruddock).  
360 Mark Aronson, ‘Commentary on “The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review and the rule of law” 
by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 35, 36  
361 The presumption of legality is not to be confused with the principle of legality referred to earlier in the context 
of Jeremy Kirk’s work. The two are intimately related, but they are different.  
64 
law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness.362 The presumption of legality has been 
cited and applied repeatedly by the High Court as a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation.363 
It has become a ‘working hypothesis’ upon which statutory language is drafted and interpreted.364  
The presumption has informed the interpretation of privative clauses and other legislative restrictions 
on judicial review, in one way or another, for centuries.365 It arises out of the complex interaction 
between the judiciary and the legislature. The supremacy of parliament must be respected, but the courts 
will not readily imply an intention to remove fundamental common law rights into the legislation 
without absolute clarity. The outcome is the need for parliament to be clear in its intention to revoke 
those rights. In this way, the presumption also operates to force parliament to squarely confront the 
consequences of its actions in infringing a person’s common law rights.366  
The need to avoid the exercise of unlimited or arbitrary exercises of power, the same rationale that 
underpins the accountability function of s 75(v), also underwrites the narrow approach to 
construction.367 In Kirk v Industrial Court of NSW,368 the majority made the observation that if privative 
clauses were interpreted literally and precluded State Supreme Courts from issuing relief where 
decisions were tainted by jurisdictional error, the effect would be to create ‘islands of power’ immune 
from supervision and restraint.369 The provision would effectively allow a decision maker to act 
unrestrained. The same rationale is applicable to the High Court’s jurisdiction under s 75(v).370 
The specific application of the presumption of legality and the fact that the Australian Constitution is 
framed upon an assumption of the rule of law, results in a narrow approach to the construction of 
privative clauses. They are construed by reference to the assumption that parliament does not intend to 
                                               
362  Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437-8 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Saeed v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252, 271 [58] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan 
and Kiefel JJ); Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1, 60-1 [119] (Gummow J).  
363 Lee v NSW Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196 [171] (Kiefel J). 
364 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 269 [84] (Edelman J); Electrolux Home products Pty Ltd v Australian Worker’s 
Union (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329 [21] (Gleeson CJ). 
365 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 269 [85] (Edelman J); see, eg, R v Jukes (1800) 8 TR 542; R v Moreley (1760) 
2 Burr. 1040; R v Plowright (1685) 3 Mod. 94. 
366 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (Lord Hoffman); Coco 
v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437-8 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Daniels Corporation 
International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543, 582 [106] 
(Kirby J).  
367 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 269-70 [86] (Edelman J); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [31] (Gleeson 
CJ).  
368 (2010) 239 CLR 531. 
369 Ibid 581 [99] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
370 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 513-14 [104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); 
Bateman, above n 6, 477.  
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deprive an aggrieved person of access to the courts, other than by express terms or necessary 
implication.371 Chief Justice Gleeson made this clear in Plaintiff S157.372 His Honour observed that all 
relevant principles of statutory interpretation were applicable; amongst the principles of statutory 
construction, reliance should be placed on the presumption of legality and the relevance of the need to 
ensure administrative decisions are taken in accordance with the jurisdiction conferred.373 This 
culminates in the presumption that the legislature does not intend to deprive the citizen of access to the 
courts, other than to the extent expressly stated or necessarily implied.374  
This narrow approach to the construction of legislative restrictions on judicial review should also be 
understood to be variable.375 The extent to which it applies will depend on the legislative context in 
question.376 In circumstances where the decision maker is concerned with the final adjudication of rights 
the rationale underpinning the narrow approach to construction warrants its application with greater 
force. Likewise, if the legislation contemplates extensive appeal and review there is much less call for 
the application of the principle.377 This is because there is less concern about the exercise of arbitrary 
power that could significantly undermine a person’s individual rights. Finally, the presumption of 
legality also comprises an element of reading statutory provisions in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution, a central principle applicable to privative clauses as explained above.378 In circumstances 
where no alternative means of appeal and review are available, a prima facie inconsistency between the 
clause and the legislation, similar to a privative clause, arises. This will be fully explored in the next 
part of this chapter. It will be demonstrated that when the inconsistency arises, the rationale for the 
narrow approach to construction applies with force allowing the High Court to adopt a narrowing 
reading of the no-invalidity clause in order to construe it consistently with the Constitution. 
                                               
371 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 270 [86] (Edelman J); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [32] (Gleeson 
CJ); Public Service Association (SA) v Federated Clerks’ Union (1991) 173 CLR 132, 160 (Dawson and Gaudron 
JJ).  
372 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [32] (Gleeson CJ).  
373 Ibid. 
374 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 270 [86] (Edelman J); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [32] (Gleeson 
CJ); Public Service Association (SA) v Federated Clerks’ Union (1991) 173 CLR 132, 160 (Dawson and Gaudron 
JJ).  
375 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 270 [86] (Edelman J) citing R v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2017] EWCA 
1868, [25] (Sales LJ, with Flaux and Floyd LJJ agreeing). 
376 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 258 [34] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 
211 CLR 476, 492 [28] (Gleeson CJ); 505 [71]-[73] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Richard 
Walter (1995) 183 CLR 168, 209 (Deane and Gaudron JJ).  
377 Probuild (2018) 92 ALJR 248, 258-60 [36]-[40] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ), 275-6 [107-
[109] (Edelman J). 
378 Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 267 (Dixon J); Morris v The Queen (2013) 
249 CLR 92, 208 [327], [329] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476 [71] (Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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C  Broad no-invalidity clauses, prima facie inconsistency and narrow construction 
In Futuris, reliance by the majority was placed on Dawson J’s statement in Richard Walter that no 
inconsistency arose between s 175 and the other provisions of the Tax Act.379 In the case of privative 
clauses, as has been explained above, there is a need for the reconciliation of the prima facie 
inconsistency between the privative clause and the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the act in 
question.380 The inconsistency is said to arise because of the grant of limited jurisdiction and the 
existence of a clause that purports to remove the power of the Court to enforce those limits.381 However, 
as Will Bateman observes, this inconsistency is not a strict antinomy.382 There is a distinction to be 
drawn between the outlining of jurisdictional limitations dealing with substantive law and a clause 
targeting the jurisdiction of a court to conduct judicial review of the decision.383  
The inconsistency that exists is actually more complex. In Kirk, the High Court said that the 
reconciliation process was more than resolving an apparent inconsistency between the privative clause 
and the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the act.384 There is, in fact, a contradiction between the 
privative clause and the rule of law.385 The rule of law, to which s 75(v) gives effect, requires that 
government be subject to the law. The High Court is the ultimate arbiter of whether administrative 
action has been taken within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred. The privative clause, if given its 
literal meaning, prevents the Court from exercising its supervisory jurisdiction and ensuring 
administrative decision makers remain within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of 
administrative power would then be liable to arbitrary and unconstrained exercise. A position that is 
incompatible with the rule of law and s 75(v). The High Court’s repugnance towards privative clauses 
is best understood in this context.386   
Of course, if a privative clause is read according to its literal meaning it is expressly inconsistent with 
s 75(v).387 It has long been established that privative clauses are to be given a meaning consistent with 
                                               
379 Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 167 [67] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
380 See discussion in Chapter II, Part B. 
381 See discussion in Chapter II, Part B. 
382 Bateman, above n 6, 478 
383 See generally Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte (1938) 59 CLR 369, 389 (Dixon J).  
384 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 579-80 [94]-[95] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
385 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 579-80 [94]-[95] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); 
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the Constitution.388 However, as previously explained, it has long been established that privative clauses 
are to be given a meaning consistent with the Constitution. The result is that the narrow approach to 
construction provides the basis for remedying the prima facie inconsistency between the privative 
clause and the rule of law. Accordingly, the privative clause is read as applying only to non-
jurisdictional errors of law.389 As noted above, a non-jurisdictional error of law is not an arbitrary or 
unconstrained exercise of power. If the protection of the privative clause does not extend to 
jurisdictional error the inconsistency with the rule of law ceases. The privative clause then operates in 
a manner consistent with the place and purpose of s 75(v) in the Constitution.  
The problem with no-invalidity clauses is that the Court’s jurisdiction to conduct judicial review is not, 
technically, subject to any restriction.390 However, the question is one of substance and degree, as 
explained in Chapter III. Interference with the minimum provision of judicial review is to be assessed 
in the broader context of administrative accountability. On that basis, where the decision is concerned 
with the final adjudication of rights because there is no alternative provision for appeal or review, a 
broad no-invalidity clause will operate to preclude any administrative accountability. It will then be 
prima facie inconsistent with the grant of limited jurisdiction and the rule of law. A narrowly cast no-
invalidity clause does not pose this problem. As was observed in Palme, judicial review for 
jurisdictional error is available on grounds otherwise arising.391 On this point, in Graham, the majority 
said the following:392 
Where Parliament enacts a law which confers a decision-making power on an officer and goes 
on to enact some other provision, not cast as a privative clause, that other provision must 
likewise be invalid if and to the extent that it has the legal or practical operation of denying to 
a court exercising jurisdiction under, or derived from, s 75(v) the ability to enforce the limits 
which parliament has expressly or impliedly set on the decision-making power which 
Parliament has conferred on the officer. 
Broadly cast no-invalidity clauses, where there are no other means of ensuring administrative 
accountability, present an inconsistency with the grant of limited jurisdiction and the rule of law. They 
are for this reason, inconsistent with the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review in s 75(v). 
The approach advanced in this chapter is consistent with the Court’s decision in Futuris. In Futuris, the 
majority made the observation that no inconsistency arose in the context of s 175 of the Tax Act because 
                                               
388 Plaintiff S157 (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492-3 504-5 [71] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); 
see also Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15A; Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth (1945), 71 CLR 
237, 267 (Dixon J); Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR, 92, 208 [327], [329] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).  
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390 See discussion in Chapter I, Part B.3. 
391 Palme (2003) 216 CLR 212, 225 [46] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ). 
392 Graham (2017) 91 ALJR 890, 902 (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
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s 175 was designed to preserve the validity of assessments outside of the Part IVC proceedings.393 The 
exhaustive appeal options available provided the basis for administrative accountability. The majority 
of Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ firmly couched their conclusion on the operation of s 175 
in those terms:394 
Section 175 must be read with ss 175A and 177(1). If that be done, the result is that the validity of 
an assessment is not affected by failure to comply with any provision of the Act, but a dissatisfied 
taxpayer may object to the assessment in the manner set out in Part IVC of the [Tax Admin Act]; 
in review and appeal proceedings under Pt IVC the amount and all the particulars of the assessment 
may be challenged by the taxpayer… Where s 175 applies, errors in the process of assessment do 
not go to jurisdiction and so do not attract the remedy of a constitutional writ under s 75(v) of the 
Constitution. 
The review proceedings offered exhaustive rights that involved appeals to the Australian Administrative 
Tribunal,395 and provided for appeals to the Federal Court.396 Accordingly, there was only a limited 
need for the narrow approach to construction. 
Notably, despite the exhaustive review procedures in place, s 175 of the Tax Act still had its limitations. 
The interpretation of no-invalidity clauses is still a question of statutory construction.397 This 
necessitates the application of all relevant principles of statutory interpretation.398 The Court found that 
s 175 had no operation in circumstances of fraud or deliberate maladministration.399 On its literal 
interpretation s 175 would appear to contemplate both. Even though there are alternative avenues of 
appeal available, the clause is still given a somewhat restrictive interpretation because of the application 
of the narrow approach to construction. Both fraud and deliberate maladministration reflect arbitrary 
exercises of power. It is presumed that the legislature did not intend to authorize this arbitrary exercise 
of power at the expense of individual rights. The rationale underpinning the narrow approach to 
construction is evident in the majority’s reasoning and without clear words the Court would not interpret 
s 175 as extending so far as to contemplate fraud or deliberate maladministration. 
Without any attempt at reconciling a broad no-invalidity clause, when no alternative mechanism to 
ensure administrative accountability is in place, the no-invalidity clause intrudes upon the place and 
                                               
393 Futuris (2008) 237 CLR 146, 157 [25] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
394 Ibid. 
395 See Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) div 4. 
396 Ibid div 5. 
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purpose of s 75(v) in the Constitution. It does so, by operating inconsistently with the rule of law in the 
same manner as a privative clause. The rule of law, in concert with a broader approach to administrative 
accountability can provide the normative basis for determining the strength of the application of the 
narrow approach to construction. Where a broad no-invalidity clause is operating to circumvent judicial 
review, because no alternative means of review are available, the right of an individual to have access 
to a court to correct errors of law and the need to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power warrant a strict 
application of the narrow approach to construction. If the no-invalidity clause was not read narrowly 
and was given its literal meaning, it would operate to create ‘islands of power’ by effectively classifying 
jurisdictional errors of law as non-jurisdictional and precluding them from review.  
In an effort to provide clarity, an example is helpful. The no-invalidity clause may be read narrowly as 
preserving the validity of the decision until otherwise set aside by the issue of a constitutional writ. This 
potential reading of a broad no-invalidity clause is consistent with the existing case law on no-invalidity 
clauses and with the important Administrative law principle that a decision affected by jurisdictional 
error is no decision at all.400 In this example, the no-invalidity clause operates to exclude the latter 
principle and maintains the validity of the decision unless and until the Court exercises its jurisdiction 
under s 75(v). A similar interpretative conclusion has been applied to ‘finality’ causes.401 Indeed, in 
Miah, Gaudron and McHugh JJ applied the same approach to a poorly drafted no-invalidity clauses in 
s 69(1) of the Migration Act.402 This understanding has the potential to resolve the difficulties posed by 
broad no-invalidity clauses in the face of no alternative means of ensuring administrative accountability. 
D Concluding Remarks 
The rationale associated with the narrow approach to the construction of privative clauses applies with 
great force to jurisdictional errors.403 If they are precluded from review, jurisdictional errors create 
islands of power that are immune from supervision and restraint. Facilitating arbitrary and 
unconstrained exercises of power. This is inconsistent with the accountability function of s 75(v) and, 
therefore, its place and purpose in the Constitution. For this reason, coupled with the application of the 
presumption of legality, privative clauses have always been construed narrowly. A broadly cast no-
invalidity clause, in circumstances where no other accountability mechanisms exist, creates the same 
difficulty. The no-invalidity clause attempts to disguise an island of power as being an error of law 
within jurisdiction. In this way it has the same substantive effect as a privative clause. The application 
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of the narrow approach to construction, informed by the presumption of legality and the need to avoid 
unconstrained and arbitrary exercises of power, facilitates a reading of the no-invalidity clause that is 
consistent with the minimum provision of judicial review.   
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   CONCLUSION 
The purpose of a no-invalidity clause is to pronounce on the validity of administrative action. It does 
this by identifying either specific legislative requirements or the legislative requirements as a whole 
and purports to bring non-compliance with those legislative requirements within jurisdiction. The no-
invalidity clause in Futuris was broad. It purported to validate decisions notwithstanding any failure to 
comply with the requirements laid out in the Tax Act. However, extensive appeal rights were available 
via Part IVC of the Tax Admin Act. The aim of the no-invalidity clause in s 175 of the Tax Act was to 
preclude review outside of the exhaustive procedures provided for by the legislation. The aim of the 
legislature was to contain appeal procedures to the channel provided by the legislation. 
Judicial review, taken under s 75(v), cannot be abrogated by the legislature. It can, however, be shaped 
in a manner that is consistent with the place and purpose of s 75(v). The question of intrusion upon the 
minimum provision of judicial review is one of substance and degree. Ultimately, no question of 
inconsistency with the place and purpose of s 75(v) and the minimum provision of judicial review arises 
in Futuris, because of the extensive alternative appeal rights afforded to aggrieved persons. 
Administrative accountability is enforced via avenues other than judicial review and the jurisdiction 
conferred upon the High Court via s 75(v) is not impeded. The same can be said for the no-invalidity 
clause in Palme. Jurisdictional error remains available on grounds arising other than those associated 
with the provision of reasons by the Minister. The effect of s 501G(4) is not to remove, or circumvent 
the High Court’s jurisdiction to conduct review. It operates to shape the manner of its exercise by 
altering the substantive law upon which it operates.  
There are, however, limits beyond which a no-invalidity clause cannot reach. The place and purpose of 
s 75(v) will be impeded and the rule of law undermined, in circumstances where legislation includes a 
broad no-invalidity clause, and where there are no alternative mechanisms for ensuring administrative 
accountability. Where no such mechanisms are provided for, the broad no-invalidity clause will be 
inconsistent with the grant of limited jurisdiction and the broader principle of the rule of law. The 
application of all relevant principles of statutory construction, including the need to reconcile the 





   BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A Journal Articles 
Aronson, Mark, ‘Commentary on ‘The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review and the rule 
of law’’(2010) 21 Public Law Review 35  
Aronson, Mark, ‘Nullity’ (2004) 40 Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 19 
Aronson, Mark, ‘Commentary on “The Entrenched Minimum Provision of Judicial Review and the 
Rule of Law” by Leighton McDonald’ (2010) 21 Public Law Review 35 
Alderton, Matthew, ‘When jurisdictional errors are not remedied: refusal of relief on discretionary 
grounds’ (2015) 23(1) Australian Journal of Administrative Law 15 
Basten, John, ‘Jurisdictional Error after Kirk: Has it a future?’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 94  
Bateman, Will, ‘The Constitution and the substantive principles of judicial review: the full scope of 
the entrenched minimum provision of judicial review’ (2011) 39 Federal Law Review 463  
Beatson, Jack, ‘The Scope of Judicial Review for Error of Law’ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 22  
Burton Crawford, Lisa, ‘Who decides the validity of executive action? No-invalidity clauses and the 
separation of powers’ (2017) 24 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 81  
Buss, William, ‘Andrew Inglis Clark’s Draft Constitution, Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, 
and the Assist from Article III of the Constitution of the United States (2009) 33 Melbourne 
University Law Review 718  
Campbell, Enid and Matthew Groves, ‘Privative Clauses and the Australian Constitution’ (2004) 4 
Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 51  
Chen, Bruce, ‘The principle of legality: Issues of rationale and application’ (2015) 41(2) Monash 
University Law Review 329  
De Smith, Stanley, ‘The prerogative writs’ (1951) Cambridge Law Journal 40  
French, Robert ‘Constitutional Review of Executive Decisions: Australia’s US legacy’ (2010) 35 
University of Western Australia Law Review 35  
Gageler, Steven ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of Australian Administrative Law’ 
(2010) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92  
Gouliaditis, Nicholas, ‘Privative Clauses: Epic Fail’ (2010) 34(3) Melbourne university Law Review 
870  
Green, Leslie, ‘The Political Content of Legal Theory’ (1987) 17 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1  
Groves, Matthew, ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the High Court of Australia’ (2008) 
33 Queen’s Law Journal 327 
Gummow, William, ‘The scope of s 75(v) of the Constitution: Why injunction but no certiorari’ 
(2014) 42(2) Federal Law Review 241  
73 
Kerr, Duncan ‘Privative Clauses and the Courts: Why and How Australian Courts have Resisted 
Attempts to Remove a Citizen’s Right to Judicial Review of Unlawful Executive Action’ (2005) 5 (2) 
Queensland University of Technology 195  
Kerr, Duncan and George Williams, ‘Review of executive action and the rule of law under the 
Australian Constitution’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 219  
Kirk, Jeremy, ‘The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review’ (2004) 12 Australian Journal 
of Administrative Law 64  
Kowtal, Giridhar, ‘Jurisdictional error and no-invalidity clauses at State level: Does the High Court 
still hold all the cards?’ (2015) 22 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 253  
Langford, Clare, ‘The prerogative writs and the origins of English Administrative law’ (2014) 88 
Australian Law Journal 567  
Leeming, Mark, ‘The riddle of jurisdictional error’ (2014) 38 Australian Bar Review 139  
Lindsay, Robert, ‘The Privative Clause and the Constitutional Imperative’ (2012) 71 Australian 
Institute of Administrative Law Forum 84 
McDonald, Leighton ‘The entrenched minimum provision of judicial review and the rule of law’ 
(2010) 21 Public Law Review 14  
Noonan, Charles, ‘Section 75(v), No-invalidity clauses ad the Rule of Law’ (2013) 36(2) University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 437  
O’Donnell, Benjamin, ‘Jurisdictional error, invalidity and the role of the injunction in s 75(v) of the 
Constitution’ (2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 291  
Reynolds, Daniel ‘The constitutionalision of administrative law: navigating the cul-de-sac’ (2013) 74 
Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum 73  
Sackville, Ronald, ‘The 2003 Term: The Inaccessible Constitution’ (2004) 27 University of New 
South Wales law Journal 66  
Saunders, Cheryl, ‘Plaintiff S157/2002: A case-study in Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2005) 12 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 115  
Spigelman, James, ‘Public Law and the Executive’ (2010) 34 Australian Bar review 10  
Spigelman, James ‘The centrality of Jurisdictional Error’ (2010) 21 Federal Law Review 77  
Stellios, James, ‘Exploring the purposes of s 75(v) of the Constitution’ (2011) 34 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 70  
Wade, William, “Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anisminic Case” (1969) 85 Law 
Quarterly Review 198  






Aronson, Mark, Bruce Dyer and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(Thomson Reuters, 4th ed, 2009)  
Aronson, Mark and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Lawbook, 5th ed, 
2013)  
Cane, Peter and Leighton McDonald, Principles of Administrative Law: Legal Regulation of 
Governance (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2008)  
Creyke, Robin, John McMillan, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and Commentary (Lexis 
Nexis Butterworths, 3rd, 2012)  
Dicey, A V, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (MacMillan, 10th ed, 1959)  
Gleeson, Murray, The Rule of Law and the Australian Constitution (ABC Books, 2000) 
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010)  
Henderson, Edith, Foundations of English Administrative Law: Certiorari and Mandamus in the 
seventeenth century (Harvard University press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1963)  
Leeming, Mark, Authority to Decide: The law of jurisdiction in Australia (The Federation Press, 
2012)  
Wade, William, Constitutional Fundamentals (Stephens & Sons, 1980) 
Zimmerman, Augusto, Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, NSW, 1st ed, 2013)  
 
C Chapters in Books 
Aronson, Mark, ‘Jurisdictional Error Without the Tears’ in Matthew Groves and H P Lee (eds), 
Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (2007)  
Aronson, Mark, ‘Jurisdictional Error without the Tears’ in Matthew Groves and H P Lee (eds), 
Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007)  
Aronson, Mark ‘The Growth of Substantive Review: the Changes, their Causes and their 
Consequences’, in John Bell et al, (eds), Public Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process 
and Substance (Hart Publishing, 2016)  
Geoffrey Kennett SC and David FC Thomas, ‘Constitutional and Administrative Law Aspects of Tax’ 
in Neil Williams (ed), Key Issues in Judicial Review (The Federation Press, 2014)  
Jeremy Kirk SC, ‘The Concept of Jurisdictional Error’ in Neil Williams (ed), Key Issues in Judicial 
Review (The Federation Press, 2014)  
John Basten, ‘Judicial review of Executive Action: Tiers of Scrutiny or Tears of Frustration?’ in Neil 
Williams (ed), Key Issues in Judicial Review (The Federation Press, 2014)  
75 
Keane, Patrick, ‘Judicial Power and the Limits of Judicial Control’ in Peter Cane (ed), Centenary 
Essays for the High Court of Australia (LexisNexis, 2004)  
Mason, Anthony, ‘The analytical Foundations, Scope and Comparative Analysis of the Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action’ in Geoffrey Lindell (ed), The Mason Papers (Federation Press, 
2007)  
Jeremy Kirk, ‘Administrative Justice and the Australian Constitution’ in Robyn Creyke and John 
McMillan (eds), Administrative Justice - The Core and the Fringe (Australian Institute of 
Administrative Law, 2000).  
D Cases 
Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v Aberfield Coal Mining Co Ltd (1942) 66 CLR 
161  
Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1  
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147  
Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596  
APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (2005) 224 CLR 322  
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 194 CLR 355  
Attorney-General (Vic) v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237  
Bank of New South Wales v The Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1  
Baxter v New South Wales Clicker’s Association (1909) 10 CLR 114  
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651  
Bros Bins Systems Pty Ltd v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2008) 74 NSWLR 
257  
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v Best (1990) 170 CLR 516  
Church of Scientology v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25  
Clancy v Butchers’ Shop Employees Union (1904) 1 CLR 181  
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 
Coal Miner’s Industrial Union of Western Australia v Amalgamated Collieries of Western Australia 
Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 437  
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 
Darlington Casino Ltd v New South Wales Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 
David Jones Finance & Investments Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 484  
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168 
76 
Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Worker’s Union (2004) 221 CLR 309 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146 
Fish v South 6 Holdings Ltd (2006) 225 CLR 180 
F J Bloeman Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 360 
Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 91 ALJR 890 
Haneef v Minister for Immigration and citizenship (2007) 161 FCR 40 
Harvey v Commissioner of State Revenue [2015] QCA 258 
Hockey v Yelland (1984) 157 CLR 124 
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 780 
In Re Gray; Ex parte Marsh (1985) 157 CLR 351 
Jarrat v Commissioner of Police for New South Wales (2005) 224 CLR 44 
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531 
Lee v NSW Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196 
Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US 137 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 
Morris v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92 
Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte (1938) 59 CLR 369  
Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1  
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2910) 243 CLR 316  
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476  
Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 92 ALJR 248  
Public Service Association (SA) v Federated Clerks’ Union (1991) 173 CLR 132  
Re Cram; Ex parte New South Wales Colliery Proprieters Association Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 117  
Re McBain; Ex Parte Bishops Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372 
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 
1165  
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 
1  
77 
Re Ministers for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs & Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Palme (2003) 
216 CLR 212  
Re Pacific Coal Pty Ltd; Ex parte Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2000) 203 CLR 
346  
Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 
R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Whybrow (1910) 11 CLR 1  
R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Worker’s Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox (1945) 70 CLR 598 
R v Jukes (1800) 8 TR 542 
R v Moreley (1760) 2 Burr. 1040 
R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387  
R v Plowright (1685) 3 Mod. 94 
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115  
R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 
Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 
SDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural affairs (2003) 199 ALR 43  
Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 
Svecova v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (1991) 39 IR 328 
State of New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118 
Stokes v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 32 ATR 500 
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189 
Tasker v Fullwood [1978] 1 NSWLR 20 
The Colonial Bank of Australasia v Robert Willan (Victoria) [1874] UKPC 28 
The Tramways Case [No 1] (1914) 18 CLR 54 
Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 






Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth)  
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)  
Judiciary Act (Cth)   
Migration Act 2001 (Cth) 
National Security (Coal Mining Industry Employment) Regulations 1941 (Cth)  
Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1994 (Cth)  
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth) 
Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 (Cth) 
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)  
 
F Parliamentary Materials 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 September 2001, 31559 – 61  
New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary debates (Hansard), 12 November 2001, 6542  
 
G Other 
The Administrative Review Council’s Discussion Paper, The Scope of Judicial Review, 2003 
Official Record of the Convention Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 4 
March 1898  
Kirk, Jeremy ‘The concept of jurisdictional error’ (paper presented to Constitutional and 
Administrative Law Section, New South Wales Bar Association, 30 May 2012).  
 
 
 
